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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the procurement of fighter aircraft as an indication of 
transatlantic relations. Specifically it asks if European rationale toward purchasing the 
Joint Strike Fighter indicates its position toward increasing military capabilities and the 
importance placed on defense cooperation with the United States. Certain observers have 
suggested that the relentless U.S. pursuit of technology in the “Revolution in Military 
Affairs” has exacerbated the capabilities gap and encouraged the U.S. to act unilaterally. 
This thesis argues the JSF offers allies a means to circumvent recent damage done in the 
Atlantic Alliance. Through a case study of four countries “expected” to purchase the JSF 
to replace U.S.-made F-16 aircraft, this thesis concludes that rationale for some who have 
heretofore abstained from the program is worrisome, but the fact that some are electing to 
pursue other choices indicates further divergences in the transatlantic realm. Through the 
views of these countries and looking at the larger picture, the JSF will further divide 
Europe and the U.S. in defense relations, as the pursuit of military technology threatens 
to drive the U.S. away from multilateralism and toward a “buy our equipment or be left 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This study examines the procurement of fighter aircraft as an indication of 
relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm. The march of technological progress symbolizes 
both a bane and blessing for the United States Armed Forces. Such progress has 
increased efficiency in all aspects of combat operations from deployment and logistics to 
global precision strike, matched by no other military force in modern history. At the same 
time, however, advances in American technology and its implementation in combat 
equipment have led to huge gaps in military capabilities between the U.S. and its allies, 
most importantly European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
In 2006, NATO stands at the precipice of an even larger fissure than of 2003 following 
the Iraq War; the pursuit of military technology threatens to drive the U.S. away from 
multilateralism and toward a “buy our equipment or be left out” attitude on the so-called 
network centric battlefield. 
This thesis studies the Joint Strike Fighter program as the technological portal to 
the modern battlefield and as a paradigm for transatlantic defense cooperation. It holds 
that maximum participation in this project would serve to increase allied capabilities and 
interoperability and consequently encourages the United States to seek maximum 
coalition partners in future operations. While unrealistic to imagine all NATO members 
purchasing this aircraft, the study argues that certain countries are “expected” to buy the 
JSF. Of note are those smaller nations unable to indigenously produce fighters or 
purchase more than one sort, and/or those that have flown F-16’s for the same reasons 
and wish to continue this positive relationship with America. The rationale germane to 
these nations’ stance toward the JSF program will elucidate the direction the European 
allies are taking with respect to closing the capabilities gap and the importance they place 
on working with the U.S. military in the future. Thus, this thesis will treat the JSF 
acquisition as a case study to highlight the seriousness of the European allies toward 
increasing their own military capabilities and the significance they still place on defense 




A study of the Joint Strike Fighter is relevant for two principal reasons. Firstly, 
the purchase of fighter aircraft is an important national political decision involving 
security and defense which offers insight into positions of the respective allied 
leadership. Because of the long lifecycle of fighter planes when compared to other 
systems and the significant portions they command of defense budgets, the acquisition of 
such leading edge materiel gives a clear picture of a nation’s defense posture and the 
priorities placed on its national security. Fighter aviation today continues to be viable as a 
strategic instrument of national power and alliance cohesion and a key component to 
dominate the modern multinational battlefield (though certainly not the only necessary 
element). Second, the JSF represents the future of fighter aircraft both with regard to 
technology and the current transatlantic cooperative nature of defense industrial bases. It 
is the only “5th-generation” fighter currently available to NATO air forces, with the latest 
in stealth technology required to defeat modern threats in the air and on the ground as 
well as an integrated and cohesive electronic warfare suite unmatched by legacy 
platforms. Its unprecedented allied involvement in the design and production phases 
qualifies it as the first true transatlantic co-development fighter venture in NATO. Thus, 
this program is a pivotal and telling example of defense procurement in the early 21st 
century that sheds light on transatlantic issues crucial for the future of the Alliance such 
as the capabilities gap and U.S./European defense cooperation. 
 
B. BACKGROUND CONDITIONS 
The topic of defense procurement as it reflects foreign and defense policy is 
certainly not a new one and its viability as a window into state policy is generally not 
questioned; but shifting dynamics in transatlantic politics, economy, and defense 
cooperation demand fresh analysis in the area of procurement policy. Ethan B. Kapstein 
has published work on not only European defense procurement as it relates to policy, but 
separately has written of the Joint Strike Fighter and its international implications.1 As 
                                                 
1 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Capturing Fortress Europe: International Collaboration and the Joint Strike 
Fighter,” Survival 46 (Autumn 2004): 137-160. For other examples of defense procurement as it relates to 
foreign and defense policy see Ethan B. Kapstein, “Allies and Armaments,” Survival 44, (Summer 2002): 
141-155 and Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” 
International Organization 49 (Winter 1995): 39-71. 
3 
the only contemporary academic work dealing with the JSF, however, it focuses on 
American views of the program and the international implications as they affect U.S. 
policy, and from a 2002 perspective. This study rather seeks insight into European views 
toward the JSF program as it reflects contemporary European foreign and defense policy 
relating to capabilities and alliance warfare. In order to do so, an overview of those more 
general issues affecting such policies is required, in the realm of both general 
transatlantic relations, specifically the evolving dynamics of alliance cohesion and 
defense industrial policy. 
 
1. General Transatlantic Trends 
Few would disagree that relations between the U.S. and Europe have been fragile 
to say the least in recent years, most of all since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
Debate exists now as to the extent of the healing that has taken place and whether 
permanent damage has occurred that may drive European nations toward further 
autonomy in the face of America. Some hold transatlantic relations to be on the mend, 
evidenced by cooperation in the Iran nuclear situation and transatlantic accord on the 
seriousness of threats faced by Europe and the U.S. alike. This viewpoint sees the second 
term of the George W. Bush Presidency quite different than the first with respect to the 
importance it places on diplomatic relations with European allies.2 However, tension and 
disagreement abounds in other arenas including what constitutes the legitimate use of 
force and American abstention from the International Criminal Court.3 Also, U.S. refusal 
to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Kyoto Treaties, U.S. treatment of prisoners 
in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the European Union arms embargo on China, and 
trade disputes involving Microsoft and Boeing continue to add to negative views of the 
                                                 
2 See Reginald Dale and Robin Niblett, “2006 Will Provide Clues to Europe’s Future,” Euro-Focus, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 12  (April 2006): 7, as well as The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2002) and A Secure Europe 
in a Better World: European Security Strategy of December 2003. 
3 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New 
York: Random House, 2003), Timothy Garten Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the surprising 
future of the West (New York: Random House, 2004) and Tod Lindberg, Beyond Paradise and Power: 
Europe, America, and the future of a troubled partnership (New York: Routledge, 2005). These works 
offer analyses of differing views on the use of force, legitimacy, and contemporary disagreements over the 
future of the U.S./Europe relationship. 
4 
U.S. in Europe.4 Several polls undertaken in Europe in 2004 and 2005 indicate no 
amelioration of public opinion toward the United States despite recent efforts to improve 
relations; some have shown perhaps further deterioration in relations in 2006.5 
A key concept in transatlantic relations involves nations’ perception of threats to 
themselves and their values, and the manner in which these threats are met.6 Numerous 
views maintain that the future of transatlantic military cooperation will involve the U.S. 
as the leader militarily with European forces focusing mainly on the lower ends of the 
“Petersberg Tasks” of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and peace enforcement.7 
European air forces continue to maintain capabilities relative to the United States, 
however, and this works examines future intentions to do the same through acquisition 
policy of combat aircraft. 
The rift over the Iraq War in 2003 led some to question the value of alliances in 
the modern world. Certain views maintained that the absence of a common threat to the 
European continent freed Europe and the U.S. to go separate ways, prompting Charles 
Krauthammer to write: “At root, it is a matter of interests. Interests diverge. No use 
wailing about it. The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted friends, America must 
carry on alone.”8 The Bush Administration was widely criticized in Europe for its 
“coalitions of the willing” policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan, and its supposed 
abandonment of multilateralism to avoid the encumbrances of allies.9 Other viewpoints 
                                                 
4 Kristin Archick, The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Reporting Service, Report #RL32577, 23 January 2006), 2. See also Joseph Quinlan, 
Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of Transatlantic Economy, Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2003. 
5 See surveys: “Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2005,” German Marshall Fund, 7 September 2005, 
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf (accessed November 2005) and 
“America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
13 June 2006, http://www.pewglobal.org (accessed December 2006). 
6 Dale and Niblett, 7. 
7 See Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, Ash, Free World and Lindberg, Beyond Paradise and Power. 
8 Charles Krauthammer, “Who Needs Allies: Now they are neutrals. America can stand tall without 
them,” Time International, 26 January 2004, 40. See also Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America 
Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) for 
a description of the Bush Administration’s “hegemonist” foreign policy and disdain of America’s allies. 
9 See Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organization 46 
(Summer 1992): 681-708 for a discussion of “minilateralism” and this concept of coalitions of the willing 
before it was known as such. 
5 
purvey the amplified importance of alliances following the events of 2003 by reasons of 
increased interconnectivity in the global security environment. Alliances are more 
necessary than before, according to this view, due in part to economic and transnational 
issues that play greater roles in providing for a nation’s security. This is in addition to 
traditional views on collective defense and the “an attack on one is an attack on all” 
mindset of before, which remains viable today.10 This thesis will focus primarily on the 
military advantages of having alliance partners, and the importance placed upon it by 
European nations in relation to the United States. To be sure, the political framework will 
also be kept in mind. 
 
2. Trends in European Defense 
The rising potential of the European Union and its European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) wield some influence over the current mindset of European powers 
toward defense and procurement policy. Some views would have the EU’s defense arm 
becoming so influential as to defacto replace NATO as the primary military force on the 
European continent. Proponents of ESDP maintain that since the EU is much more than a 
military organization, many prefer to exert influence with its “soft power” over NATO’s 
U.S.-led military power. This would logically lead to greater European defense autonomy 
and decreased American influence in NATO and thus in Europe.11 Alternate points of 
view maintain that NATO remains the military power in the North Atlantic Area and both 
sides of the Atlantic must keep this as the underlying tenet of strong transatlantic defense 
cooperation. Frances G. Burwell and his co-authors point to the negative influence of 
certain U.S. policymakers’ views on the EU as a threat to America and its influence in 
NATO; likewise EU policymakers’ outlook on NATO as primarily a U.S.-dominated 
organization is unhealthy for transatlantic defense relations. They recommend the U.S. 
not fear autonomous EU action and even consider contributing needed assets such as 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Alliances and American National Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2006). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987) for a comprehensive look at rationale for alliances that remains valid today. 
11 Leo A. Michel, NATO-EU-United States: Why not a virtuous ‘ménage à trois’? (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2006). See also Kristin Archick, The 
United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Report #RL32577, 23 January 2006) and Chaillot Paper no. 87: EU Security and Defense Core 
Documents 2005 (Paris: Institute for Strategic Studies, European Union, March 2006).  
6 
airlift and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platforms to EU missions. At the same time, the EU 
should cease fearing NATO as a U.S. tool and abandon the idea that ESDP could replace 
NATO. They maintain that NATO must remain the military power in the North Atlantic 
Area and the major transatlantic link.12 This study seeks insight into European leaders’ 
rationale toward greater defense integration, which might be reflected in their rationale 
toward the Joint Strike Fighter. The quest for autonomy, while difficult to weigh, has to 
be kept in mind as a background condition for defense procurement decisions. 
 
3. Trends within NATO 
 
a. Consensus Rule and Coalition Warfare 
Declaratory policy typically espouses the health of the Atlantic Alliance at 
an all-time high, and currently this is no different. Numerous NATO press releases and 
documents indicate the health of the Alliance has never been better. Secretary General 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer affirmed in April of 2006 that President Bush’s visit in February 
of 2005 mended the rifts in the Alliance over the Iraq War, and NATO has since moved 
on to act unanimously as a coalition of 26 countries in both Iraq and Afghanistan.13 
Recent statements hint that the Alliance may be reanalyzing the concept of consensus 
rule, perhaps symbolizing a permanent departure from unwavering cohesion in military 
operations. NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance from the Riga Summit of 





                                                 
12 Frances G. Burwell, David C. Gompert, Leslie S. Lebl, Jan M. Lodal, and Walter B. Slocombe, 
Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture (Washington D.C.: The Atlantic 
Council, 2005), 20-23. 
13 “Beyond the North Atlantic,” National Journal, 8 April 2006. 
7 
The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, 
to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in 
crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response 
operations, as set out in the Strategic Concept.14 
Recent coalition operations highlight the operational capability and 
cohesiveness of NATO as a military organization. Perhaps the best measure of the current 
state of the Alliance lies in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). Particularly in ISAF, political and operational problems in the Alliance are 
highlighted, but the corresponding “work-arounds” and solutions imply that NATO can 
operate effectively albeit not at the full potential offered with more evenly distributed 
capabilities and improved interoperability.15 Though it exhibits the important operational 
issues affecting cohesion in the Alliance today, Afghanistan does not tell the full story of 
the direction NATO is following for the future. Long term issues of contention in the 
Alliance still remain as well, to include burden sharing, levels of defense spending, and 
most importantly the capabilities gap between U.S. forces and their European 
counterparts. 
 
b. Capabilities Gap 
There exists an abundance of literature on the “capabilities gap” between 
the U.S. and its European allies, which was highlighted following the 1999 Operation 
Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo and continues to be an issue in ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan. Failure of European air forces to modernize equipment combined with the 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) in the U.S. led to serious interoperability 
problems with U.S. forces in OAF and forced the U.S. Air Force to bear the brunt of the 
sorties while the Europeans stood somewhat helplessly on the sidelines. This prompted 
numerous studies on the issue and was the impetus for NATO’s Prague Capabilities 
Commitment of 2002 and the push for greater capability in the emerging ESDP.16 The 
                                                 
14 Comprehensive Political Guidance: Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 
November 2006, NATO Online Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed 
December 2006). (Italics added by author). 
15 Paul Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Report #RL 33627, 22 August 2006). 
8 
RAND Corporation performed a study in 2004 concerning the interoperability of NATO 
air forces and concluded that coalition warfare will require interoperability at all levels of 
warfare and national interaction in the future.17 This study included little data from OAF 
and deserves revising in the light of lessons learned in Kosovo, improvements undertaken 
in the ensuing years by European air forces, and the status of those improvements in 
regards to interoperability in ISAF. 
A large part of the literature available concerning the military capability 
gap focuses on defense spending. Many scholars and analysts have asserted that 
European countries have spent considerably less than the U.S. on defense for some time, 
but their lack of robust investment in research and development (R and D) has chiefly 
contributed to the capabilities gap, and unless a significant increase in the R and D budget 
is undertaken, this gap will continue to widen.18 A unique theory is offered by Sorin 
Lungu, inviting the reader to wonder if the U.S. deliberately chose to aggressively pursue 
technological advances in military equipment at the end of the Cold War in order to 
widen the capabilities gap and increase its influence over Europe in military affairs and 
corresponding defense industrial bases.19 Jack Sine argues that the U.S. pursuance of 
technology in its Revolution in Military Affairs serves to distance it from its allies and is 
incompatible with parallel policies advocating multilateral cooperation in defense 
matters.20 These approaches to the issue of the capabilities gap fail to look at attempts to 
share R and D funding and to pursue common equipment that will put both sides of the 
Atlantic at the forefront of technology. The Joint Strike Fighter will serve both purposes 
                                                 
16 A portion of these studies includes: Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: Strategic 
and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), Kosovo/Operation Allied Force 
After-Action Report: Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000), and Paul 
Gallis, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Report #RL30374, 14 November 1999). 
17 Eric Larson, Gustav Lindstrom, Myron Hura, Ke Gardiner, Jim Keffer, and Bill Little, The 
Interoperability of NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Case Studies (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
2004), x-xiv. 
18 David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a 
Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999). 
19 Sorin Longu, “European Perceptions of U.S. High-Technology and Defense Strategies since the 
Final Days of the Cold War: A Sine Qua Non Research Agenda?” Strategic Insights IV, Issue 6 (June 
2005). 
20 Jack L. Sine II, “Organizing the Fight: Technological Determinants of Coalition Command and 
Control and Combat Operations” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).  
9 
and warrants reconsideration of the capabilities gap matter. This thesis examines the JSF 
as insight into European thinking toward matching U.S. efforts to improve military 
capacities through technology. 
 
4. Transatlantic Trends in Defense Procurement 
The history of procurement policies in NATO is closely tied to political initiatives 
and the health of defense industries in the U.S. and Europe. Chapter 2 of this manuscript 
examines the historical record of cooperative defense projects and their relation to the 
defense industrial bases in the U.S. and Europe. The decade following the end of the Cold 
War saw the merging of numerous defense firms in the U.S. followed by the same in 
Europe but at a slower rate due to industry protection and national economic interests 
hindering the progress. In 2006, several views exist as to the future of defense industrial 
bases in NATO nations. Terrence R. Guay in his 2005 manuscript for the U.S. Army War 
College entitled “The Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and 
their Implications” maintains that a “bipolar” defense industrial base is a distinct 
possibility between the U.S. and Europe, due to increased integration and attempts to 
block American defense business form the continent. He recommends increased 
cooperation between government, industry and militaries to create a true transatlantic 
defense industrial base.21 
Certain European views still hold that a defense industrial base independent of the 
U.S. is the best option for integrating defense industries, and is best for the long-term 
health of defense industries in Europe. The rising influence of the ESDP led to the 
creation of a European Defense Agency (EDA) which now lobbies for a European 
Defense and Equipment Market (EDEM), essentially a fully autonomous defense 
industrial base.22 The EU recently passed a “Code of Conduct” to attempt to open up 
intra-European competition for defense contracts and move away from “national 
                                                 
21 Terrence R. Guay, The Transatlantic Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and their 
Implications (Carlile, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005). 
22 Burkard Schmitt, Defense Procurement in the European Union: The Current Debate (Paris: 
Institute for Strategic Studies, European Union, 2005), 5. 
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champions” that are protected by governments.23 However, many analysts agree that 
further transatlantic cooperation is not only inevitable but best for both sides of the 
Atlantic. Some recommend a “country cluster” approach to optimize the niche 
capabilities of smaller firms and help those nations with less than a complete defense 
industrial base. Those who support further transatlantic cooperation point to the Joint 
Strike Fighter as the paradigm program in this approach.24 
This study treats the F-16 sale to four European nations in 1975 as an example of 
the positive results capable in transatlantic cooperative ventures. Chapter 3 presents a 
case study which outlines the specific merits of the program from a European 
perspective, and why a similar program which allows further cooperative work in design 
and manufacturing has added value for both the U.S. and Europe in 2006. The JSF is 
analyzed as that program, and applied to the current state of cooperation in defense 
industrial bases.25 
 
C. IS THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER THE ANSWER? 
As transatlantic cooperation is opening up among defense industries, this thesis 
argues that European countries should at least be considering the JSF for their next 
tactical aircraft. There are European aircraft alternatives available such as the 
Eurofighter, the French-made Dassault Rafael, and the Saab Gripen from Sweden. Not 
surprisingly, arguments abound as to why each aircraft is better than the others and 
should be purchased by all interested. Vance Coffman, then CEO of Lockheed Martin, 
                                                 
23 The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, European Union Document (European Defense 
Agency, 2006). 
24 See Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the arms industry: The next proliferation 
challenge,” International Security 19, (Fall 1994): 171, and See Phillip Taylor, “Weapons Standardization 
in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic Competition?” International Organization, Winter 1982 for 
views advocating transatlantic cooperation. Michèle A. Flournoy, Julianne Smith, Guy Ben-Ari, Kathleen 
McInnis, David Scruggs, European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and 
Capabilities (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005) is a comprehensive 
work on European defense industries and recommends the “country cluster” approach. See also Guay, The 
Transatlantic Industrial Base for an excellent overview of transatlantic issues in defense industries. 
25 See Ingemar Dorfer, Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) for 
an excellent overview of the transatlantic situation during the F-16 deal and Ann Markusen, “The Rise of 
World Weapons,” Foreign Policy 114, (Spring 1999): 40-51 for an example of views advocating the Joint 
Strike Fighter as the follow-on to the success built in the F-16 program and for the health of industrial bases 
in both the U.S. and Europe.  
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told Defense Daily in 2001 that the influence the U.S. gained with the F-16 program 
should be exploited to ensure the sale of the JSF to our allies. As he said: “If we choose 
to turn away from that market, we will have made a major decision in terms of U.S. 
international trade and cooperation with our allies. They will find another product 
somewhere, all of them. It won't be a product that is as well integrated as the F-16 has 
become around the world, and it won't be a product that has the capability as the JSF.”26 
The Gripen is billed as a lightweight 4th-generation fighter not able to match the JSF (a 
5th-generation aircraft, explained in detail in Chapter 3) in capability but likely much 
cheaper.27 The Eurofighter is generally accepted to be 4th-generation and geared toward 
counter-air roles while being somewhat overpriced compared to the JSF.28 The French 
Rafale has seen trouble with export sales due to its heretofore absence in the French Air 
Force until recently, and is widely viewed as “too French” to be palpable to other air 
forces.29 While it is difficult to objectively measure one aircraft against another, 
especially given the fluid and ever-changing environment of determining per-aircraft 
costs, Defense-Aerospace.com issued a first-rate report in July 2006 explaining what is 
entailed in cost figures. They rank the fighters currently available on the market by price, 
and explain methodology and different manners of arriving at numbers offered by 
governments and manufacturers.30 
 
1. JSF Program 
A Congressional Research Report dated 2 June 2006 is an excellent source for the 
background and issues facing the Joint Strike Fighter program. Additional works which 
serve to describe the program and its international implications include a July 2003 
                                                 
26 Vago Muradian, “Coffman: JSF Critical to Preserving U.S. Leadership in World Fighter Market,” 
Defense Daily, 26 February 2001. 
27 “The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4th Generation Wild Card,” Defense Industry Daily, 25 August 
2006, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/08/the-jas39-gripen-swedens-4th-generation-wild-
card/index.php (accessed August 2006). 
28 “Q & A: What makes the Eurofighter fly?” BBC News Website, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1818077.stm (accessed July 2006). 
29 Christina MacKenzie, “Rafale, the French Fighter, Scrambles for Export Orders,” International 
Herald Tribune, 17 July 2006. 
30 “Sticker Shock: Estimating the real costs of modern fighter aircraft,” DefenseAerospace.com, 
(Defense-aerospace.com document, 12 July 2006). 
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Government Accountability Office report and a June 2003 Department of Defense Study 
concerning the international industrial participation aspect of the program.31 These 
documents address which countries entered the program at which level, and with 
different stipulations and requirements for their particular defense industrial bases. They 
explain how the phases of the program are constructed and investments proffered by 
different nations to this point. Through this we can clearly see the difference in a program 
such as the F-16, which was almost exclusively designed and built in the U.S., and the 
Joint Strike Fighter program, which encompasses international cooperation from program 
inception. Issues concerning industrial offsets and U.S. desire to further its own defense 
industrial base are clearly spelled out in these works, with discussions of different 
grievances aired by the participating countries and their threats of discontinuing the 
program. An analysis of recent trends can build on these works and will offer insight into 
European defense policy. 
Numerous issues have arisen in partner countries regarding the nature of the JSF 
program and U.S. domination therein. In February of 2006, the Pentagon announced 
plans to cancel the UK-produced second engine of the JSF at the same time delays in the 
aircraft program caused the British Defense Ministry to move forward with new carrier 
designs without the anticipated new aircraft. This caused a considerable amount of 
tension between the two countries which was documented in numerous media outlets. 
Additionally, the General Accounting Office later issued a report faulting the U.S. 
decision, which was later reversed.32 The Congressional Research Service assessed the 
impact of this decision on the program and specifically on the international partners, 
concluding that greater oversight of the program was needed.33 
                                                 
31 Christopher Bolkom, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program: Background, Status, and Issues 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report #RL30563, 2 June 2006); Joint Strike Fighter 
Acquisition: Cooperative Program needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals are Met, (Washington D.C.: 
General Accounting Office, GAO-03-775, 21 July 2003); JSF International Participation: A Study of 
Country Approaches and Financial Impacts on Foreign Suppliers (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, June 2003). 
32 Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was 
Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-06-717R). 
33 Christopher Bolkom, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report #RL33390, 13 April 2006). 
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Much scrutiny has been brought to the JSF program itself from U.S. governmental 
organizations, in part due simply to the design of the defense procurement system. The 
GAO has issued several reports criticizing the business case, especially the plan to 
commence production of the jet before 1 percent of the flight testing is completed.34 
More relevant to this thesis is a 2003 GAO report detailing the challenges of the JSF 
international program and recommending greater oversight to ensure the continued 
support and interest of the partner countries.35 The House of Representatives held a 
hearing to discuss the GAO report and the JSF international program, where partner 
country’s reasons for joining the program were discussed. Specifics were also discussed 
concerning which advantages were offered to countries of different tiers and how 
technology sharing and the concept of “best value” works in practicality when doling out 
subcontracts to foreign firms.36 
  
2. Participating Countries, Issues, and Abstainers 
Numerous newspaper and magazine accounts chronicle the process of different 
countries signing up for the JSF program and their grievances and problems therein. 
There is an abundance of articles containing quotes from defense ministers and 
politicians as the final MOU’s were signed in 2002 officially bringing the eight partner 
countries into the program.37 These press accounts combined with statements from 
politicians and defense industry personnel can offer insight into nations’ interest in the 
JSF and their respective future defense postures, as well as the positive potential of the 
program itself. There are also well-documented instances of problems arising after the 
signing of the MOU’s, most notably with Norway and the UK. These can offer insight 
                                                 
34 Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals are not Supported by Knowledge-based F-22A and JSF 
Business Cases, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-06-487T, 16 March 2006) and 
Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different 
Acquisition Strategy, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-05-271, 15 March 2005). 
35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals 
are Met, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-03-775, 21 July 2003). 
36 Is DOD meeting Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) International Cooperative Program Goals? Hearing 
before the subcommittee on national security, emerging threats, and international relations, 108th Congress 
First Session, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). 
37 In 2002, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom joined the System Design and Development phase of the Joint Strike Fighter program along with 
the United States. 
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into shortcomings of the program as it is currently handled, and possible near-term 
solutions. One sparse area in the literature concerns the reasons why certain countries 
have abstained from the program to date. A study of domestic politics and declared 
policy in these nations will shed light on the rationale at hand, but locating the actual 
reasoning is a challenge. Weighing the factors as they play on government decision-
makers is perhaps most difficult. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for conducting this project is a simple case study of selected 
countries participating in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The European countries that 
are involved in the JSF are examined as well as the key European nations operating the F-
16 that have abstained from the program. Focus is on the original four European 
Participating Air Force (EPAF) F-16 members: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway in order to establish the constant of previous experience operating American 
equipment in an organized consortium which shares tactics, logistics, and other 
operationally important concepts. Interviews with national representatives of Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Norway to the JSF program office were conducted to provide 
insight. Also, numerous interviews with Belgian military and industry representatives 
combined with the author’s experience in the Belgian Air Force provided great insight 
into rationale present in this country. The United Kingdom, as the sole Tier 1 partner, 
offers a view into the structure of the program and some established problems therein are 
best explained through the UK lens. The Dependent Variable is a country’s decision to 
purchase the aircraft, and independent variables explain influencing factors such as the 
planned purchase of a similar aircraft, economic issues, current political relations with the 
Untied States, relative size of the country, grievances with the JSF program and its 
perceived need for a 5th generation fighter. Intervening variables are addressed as well, 
such as domestic political issues within the countries, industry’s role, and transatlantic 
relations. Several assumptions will need to be established before addressing the list of 
variables. For example, a brief discussion of the JSF capabilities will argue that in fact it 
is superior in capability to other options such as the Eurofighter and Gripen, thus 
eliminating the question of whether decision-makers are opting for a better aircraft. 
15 
In seeking answers to the status of the capabilities gap and European views on 
alliance warfare with the United States in the 21st century, a study of the Joint Strike 
Fighter will offer great insight as both the paradigm cooperative defense venture and 
most capable combat aircraft available to European nations with regards to technology 
and interoperability. To arrive at the current rationale for procuring fighter aircraft in 
Europe, an historical perspective is necessary to frame the contemporary state of affairs. 
This will be undertaken in two timeframes, and we begin with a study of transatlantic 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
17 
II. INFLUENCES AFFECTING EUROPEAN FIGHTER 
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT DURING THE COLD WAR 
The procurement of military hardware signifies a complicated process with 
implications of utmost importance for a nation’s security and the political livelihood of 
those figures in uniform and mufti who make such choices.38 The factors involved in the 
decision making process for defense procurement fall into three general categories: 1) 
Political Influences (from such external sources as alliances and other countries as well 
as domestic politics), 2) Defense Industrial Bases and their respective vitality and 
capacity and 3) Military Influence that a state requires and/or desires. Of course, these 
categories are not mutually exclusive and in fact interact quite dynamically in the process 
of making major purchases for the purpose of a country’s defense. Nation-states 
understandably prefer to produce their arms autonomously, though this policy is possible 
only with adequate technological know-how and corresponding industrial capacity. The 
next most desirous choice is to co-develop their arms with other countries, thus to act as 
equal partners while sharing the technology and costs beginning in the initial design 
stages of a program. Co-production of weapons is a state’s next choice, which allows 
some degree of industrial participation but without the corresponding influence afforded 
by the “equal partner” approach. Lastly, the simple importation of weapons “off the 
shelf” allows a nation-state to fulfill its military needs, but with little chance to influence 
the capability of the system and no corresponding industrial benefits (See Figure 1).39  
This chapter begins with a historical study of defense procurement in Western 
Europe during the Cold War, focusing on fighter aircraft and the relative weight of the 
three aforementioned categories. These factors influenced nation-states in different ways 
but throw into clear light the dynamics present in the decisions to procure Europe’s  
 
                                                 
38  Scholarly works of interest to this question that focus on case studies of U.S. forces in the cold war: 
Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1980); Frederic Bergerson, 
The Army Gets an Air Force  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980);   Michael Brown, Flying 
Blind: the Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program  (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1992).  
39 Ethan B. Kapstein, “International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second Best 
Solution,” Political Science Quarterly 106, No. 4 (1991-1992): 660. 
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combat aircraft. The section finishes with a case study of the F-16 purchase by four 
European countries in 1975 to further analyze the factors in actual experience versus the 
grey realm of scholarly theory. 
 
 
Figure 1.   State Strategies for Acquiring Weapons. 
 
The weight of U.S. power in the air of the decade of the late-1940s and early-
1950s implies that a scholarly comparison with the aviation world of a half century ago 
and that of today underscores significant discontinuities. Then the U.S. had an 
unchallenged predominance of economic might and technological finesse.40 Nonetheless, 
the NATO allies began their defense procurement behavior and policy in this very period, 
and as such this era forms the foundation for any understanding of the topic at hand. The 
Western Europeans faced the dilemma of guns and butter amid the need to build up the 
defense of the West on the devastated post-war societies and economies of 1948/9. Thus, 
the immediate call for relief by the demoralized domestic populations which led to the 
European Recovery Program of 1947 blended with pressure from the United States and 
the nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organization to build up militaries to counter the 
                                                 
40 One should note that much of U.S. progress in aviation had come, in part, at the expense of the 
defeated Germans. See John Farquharson, “Governed or exploited? The British Acquisition of German 
Technology, 1945-1948,” Journal of Contemporary History 32 (January 1997): 33-42 and Takashi 
Nishiyama, “Cross-Disciplinary Technology Transfer in Trans-world War II Japan,” Comparative 
Technology Transfer and Society 1 (December 2003): 316. 
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Soviet threat in 1950.41 The defense industrial bases of the Western European NATO 
allies at the time were nearly nonexistent on the continent, and when rearmament 
commenced in the Korean War most countries were obliged to turn to U.S. material while 
relying on the American umbrella (both conventional and nuclear) and the collective 
defense offered by NATO. Military capability was quickly recognized as a priority in the 
face of the Soviet buildup in the East, but when faced with difficult budget decisions and 
a decimated public, most governments realized “priority” to be a relative term. Once the 
economies and societies of Western Europe had rebounded from the nadir of the post war 
years, in the early-1960s, did the nation-states of Western Europe proceed to a stance on 
defense procurement of partners more than supplicants. It was then that defense industrial 
bases and desired military capabilities entered the mix with political factors, and the 
former began to interact with the latter to shape the defense posture on the continent. 
 
A. POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
The years following the end of the Second World War, that is, 1945 until 1960, 
witnessed a commonality in domestic political factors in Western Europe which 
influenced national decisions to buy weapons. Western European industry was devastated 
and recovery focused on the civilian sector, while the general public was much more 
concerned with jobs and basic subsistence than with military forces. The issue of 
autonomous defense capability was not at the forefront of the public’s concerns, 
especially when one considered that the United States provided the bulk of the equipment 
to counter the Soviet threat. Most military equipment which found its way to Europe 
through the early 1950’s was part of the American Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 
1949 and the Mutual Security Acts of the 1950’s, which in effect removed the issue of 
defense procurement from public concern (and thus politicians’ agendas) for some 
time.42 Until the recovery of European defense industries in the 1960s, most political  
 
 
                                                 
41 Ian Q.R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (Lantham: Rowan 
and Littlefield, 1997). See also Thies, 22-29. 
42 Philip Taylor, “Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collaborative Security or Economic 
Competition?” International Security 36, No. 1 (Winter 1982): 99. See also Thies, 64-65. 
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influence on governments’ defense-related purchases came from within NATO itself and 
in effect what is called the cascading of weapons from the richer NATO powers to those 
less endowed. 
Initially, the Alliance considered weapons standardization the most important 
issue for national governments to address after defense spending. The standardization of 
weapons within the Alliance brought advantages from several important aspects, a point 
realized by NATO’s decision-makers in the 1950s. Operating the same equipment as 
one’s allies not only offered a multitude of interoperability benefits, it also greatly 
simplified the issue of finding spare parts during wartime. The aim of such NATO 
agencies as the Military Agency for Standardization (formed in 1951) was to realize not 
only the operational benefits but also the commercial advantages of operating the same 
equipment.43 The economic advantages of mutual R and D funding and common 
production lines, or “rationalizing” arms production, had the adverse effect of reinforcing 
the reluctance of member states to increase their defense budgets. NATO as an 
organization therefore promoted RSI (Rationalization, Standardization, and 
Interoperability) in weapons procurement to lower unit costs and increase the amount of 
equipment available to purchase for a given sum.44 However, despite years of promoting 
RSI, factors such as economic issues, national protection of defense industrial bases, and 
political issues present in consensus decision-making limited the number of times the 
Alliance attempted to develop and purchase a common weapons system. A common 
fighter program was never attempted, and the NATO AWACS serves to demonstrate the 
reasons for this fact. 
NATO’s only successful example of an alliance-wide defense acquisition is that 
of its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet. The program nonetheless 
demonstrates the complex political and nearly impossible political and economic 
obstacles to be surmounted in such an endeavor. A study in 1970 unexpectedly 
determined that Soviet aircraft were capable of flying under the existing air defense 
structure, identifying the critical need for airborne surveillance to prevent a sneak attack 
                                                 
43  NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954), 125. 
44 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003), 15, 111. 
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from the east. NATO’s defense ministers quickly professed the requirement for such a 
system, soon agreeing that unilateral or semi-cooperative programs were not feasible 
given the large budgetary constraints. Since all countries urgently needed the aircraft and 
no viable option existed in the European defense industries, the only logical solution was 
an alliance-wide purchase of the U.S.-made Boeing E-3 AWACS.45 But the political and 
economic realities of who would pay for what and when soon proved that a collectively 
owned and operated asset would be no easy task. Years of negotiations preceded the 
agreement to finally purchase the 18 aircraft, with numerous political and economic 
issues surfacing throughout.46 
The British logically preferred their aircraft (The Nimrod anti-submarine patrol 
plane based on the Comet transport of the 1950s) and pulled out of the program, only to 
eventually purchase what became the Boeing E-3C through a different program years 
later. France predictably avoided commitment to a non-French product while still keeping 
its cards on the table, but in the end did not take part in the NATO program.47 Germany 
struggled with significant defense budget problems, a reluctant parliament, and newly-
elected left of center politicians unwilling to spend their political capital on such a large 
purchase. Belgium and Portugal faced either unstable or fallen governments with interim 
ministers who remained powerless to take decisions for several years. Italy’s defense 
minister was reluctant to ask his generals for approval as his predecessor awaited jail time 
for a large bribery scandal involving U.S. aircraft several years before. Greece and 
Turkey became logical special-needs cases with their unique demands vis-à-vis their 
underlying dispute. And all countries haggled over fiscal matters such as percentage 
shares, payment schedules (all wanted to pay later) and industrial offsets. In the end, the 
program was approved with Luxembourg the only partner endorsing the purchase with 
unwavering support and no special stipulations or concessions.48  
                                                 
45 Note: The British Nimrod aircraft was also considered but quickly voted down by all except the 
British. 
46 Arnold Lee Tessmer, Politics of Compromise: NATO and AWACS (Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 1988), 3. 
47 Note: Ironically, the French also purchased the Boeing aircraft years later on their own after several 
failed attempts within their own industry. This followed the French use of the KC-135 for the Force de 
Frappe, another Boeing aircraft of far simpler technological finesse than the AWACS. 
48 Tessmer, Politics of Compromise: NATO and AWACS, 49. 
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But despite its unlikely success, the AWACS program proved why alliance-wide 
purchases have been the exception rather than the rule, and virtually impossible for the 
purchase of fighter aircraft. First, the program of the early- and mid-1970s was unique in 
that all countries could agree (rather quickly) on a common and urgent requirement with 
minimal haggling over details. The strategic situation of the time as well as the 
willingness in NATO to shoulder more of the conventional military burden had increased 
steadily as the U.S. was, itself, recovering from the Vietnam War. Secondly, there was no 
bargaining over who would produce which part of the aircraft to benefit national 
aerospace industries. The program was already underway in the United States for the 
USAF, but lacked support and funding, essentially an “aircraft looking for a mission,”49 
and this combined with its urgent requirement precluded any time-consuming bartering 
over industrial offsets. The American firm Boeing held a virtual monopoly over NATO’s 
options in this case, which greatly simplified the process.  
In sum, in its first decades, NATO attempted to pressure its member states to 
procure common equipment, but in the end, this proved impossible, especially for fighter 
jets. NATO remained a consultative organization in this sense, advising on procurement 
issues, but unwilling and unable to dictate military requirements within the context of 
consensus rule. The Alliance embarked on a wholly different course, as befitted such a 
diverse organization with widely different ideas about arms and industrial policy. Several 
other alliance-wide projects were attempted, but the lack of both urgent need and 
manufacturing monopolies resulted in program failures.50 National decision-makers 
certainly listened to the demands of the Alliance, but other factors rapidly entered the 
foray. The revival of European economies soon rendered collaborative defense projects 
(rather than alliance-wide commitments) much more viable and transatlantic and Alliance 
issues took a back seat to resurgent defense industrial bases. 
 
 
                                                  
49 Tessmer, 3. 
50 Examples included the HAWK missile, common tank treads, and the NATO Frigate. See Taylor, 
“Weapons Standardization in NATO,” 99.    
23 
B. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASES 
The resurgence of European defense industries interacted with events in the 
United States during the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s to shape the state of transatlantic defense 
procurement in the early-21st century. While the perceived level of the Soviet threat 
waxed and waned, common security goals and NATO’s RSI aspirations remained a 
constant feature of how the Alliance functioned. However, the U.S. desire for defense 
industry dominance collided with Europe’s need for autonomy in the same to create an 
unpleasant undertone in transatlantic relations during this period. In particular, the 
manner in which the U.S. had shifted the defense burden by neo-mercantilist offset 
agreements or the blind imposition of weapons was bound to promote a backlash, 
especially as a European aerospace industry found its wings in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
power struggle would play itself out in the realm of fighter aircraft production and sales, 
with some degree of stabilization seen as the Cold War ended. 
When the Kennedy administration came to power in 1961, budget constraints and 
economic pragmatism steered the U.S. policy on European defense away from merely 
doling out aid and toward the selling of American equipment to its allies. The 
Eisenhower administration had struggled with the economic burdens of stationing U.S. 
forces in Europe amid the growth of the western European economies, and this became a 
source of domestic political friction inherited by the Kennedy administration.51 Economic 
recovery on the continent had allowed European countries to start providing more for 
their own defense, and the U.S. defense industry would stand to gain from these 
purchases. It seemed to the U.S. a fair compromise to sell American products but allow 
some degree of production overseas, exemplified in such programs as the F-104G, which 
is discussed later. Certain wary NATO partners, however, felt such programs would only 
serve to increase U.S. influence.52 In addition, Europeans feared the U.S. was exploiting 
their relative size advantage through NATO, in essence calling for further standardization 
of Alliance weapons in order to create more opportunities to sell their products across the 
Atlantic. This increase in production would subsequently drive the per unit equipment 
cost down, allowing the U.S. military to purchase more items and accordingly increasing 
                                                 
51 Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 97. 
52 Taylor, 99. 
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the pressure on Europe to operate the same equipment.53 Thus, the rather obtrusive U.S. 
foot in Europe’s door caused European governments to fear an American technological 
monopoly and led to cries for autonomy in their defense industries. 
The initial response was for the larger countries to protect their “national 
champions” in defense industries, but they soon realized that national autonomy in this 
realm would mean certain doom for their industries.54 In 1968, the formation of 
Eurogroup began the consolidation of European defense industries,55 but it stalled 
without French industrial participation. The Independent European Program Group 
(IEPG) of 1976 included the French and represented Europe’s first collective effort to 
stand up to U.S. defense industrial hegemony.56 Though Europe clearly lacked the 
technological competence to match the U.S. at the time, Eurogroup and IEPG served as a 
warning across the Atlantic that the days of American dominance were numbered in the 
1970s. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger feared a “Euro-cartel” and 
consequently promoted the concept of the “two-way street” to open up transatlantic 
defense markets.57 Critics of the two-way street argued that while it would be 
advantageous for Europe to continue buying American defense products, it was 
unrealistic to expect the U.S. to buy any significant amount of European hardware. 
Mechanical problems with the British Harrier jet operated by the U.S. Marines at the time 
pointed to the operational disadvantage of dependence on foreign military equipment.58 
Thus, the stakes of the aerospace Alliance procurement game were clearly changing for 
both sides. Europe was willing but unable to go it alone and the U.S. was realizing that 
competitive R and D and competitive production was driving away its European allies. A 
compromise was needed but the two-way street didn’t seem to offer the solution. 
                                                 
53 Thies, 139. 
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today is perhaps limiting the export capability of its newest fighter aircraft, the Rafale. 
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In 1983, David Abshire left his position as president of the Center for 
International and Strategic Studies to serve as President Reagan’s U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the North Atlantic Council. There he took the unprecedented step to 
promote defense collaboration as an American policy, in essence coalescing defense 
industrial issues with those political-military in nature. Surely such was a reflection of the 
Cold War tensions of the year 1983, but the implications for the subject were compelling. 
This policy eventually led to the celebrated Nunn Amendment, of Sam Nunn, Democratic 
Senator from Georgia, whose expertise in NATO was a central feature of U.S. 
transatlantic policy from the 1970s until the 1990s. The law required U.S. defense firms 
to seek collaboration and interoperability with its allies. This demarche seemed at least on 
paper to end the power struggle between American and European defense industries.59 
Ethan Kapstein summed up the Nunn Amendment from the U.S perspective: 
The Nunn Amendment provides several incentives to American defense 
firms to ensure their participation in collaborative co-development. First, it 
offers a pool of research funds for cash-starved defense industries, so long 
as they collaborate in weapons R and D. Second, by promoting 
collaboration, the amendment helps maintain access for U.S. defense firms 
to the European market, it advances RSI, and it encourages the spread of 
economic and technological risks inherent in weapons development. 
Finally, by subsidizing research, it reduces the upfront expenditures that 
companies must commit to a new weapons program. In sum, the 
amendment appears to serve prominent state and industry objectives.60 
Decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were pleased, as the machinery was in 
place to prevent the need to choose in the future between the pressures of Alliance RSI 
and the health of their own defense industrial bases. The historic compromise pointed to 
the birth of true transatlantic defense industrial collaboration. 
What effect did the Nunn Amendment have on fighter procurement in Europe? 
Initially, results were scarce. NATO developed the Conventional Armament Planning 
System (CAPS) in 1987 which attempted to “highlight NATO equipment deficiencies, 
and provide coordinated guidance and comparisons for national armament planners on 
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short-, medium- and long-term requirements.”61 However, as is often the case in the 
purchase of fighter aircraft, their relative portion of respective defense budgets and the 
involvement of national industry rendered the process too cumbersome and too political 
to be guided by NATO military authorities. Instead, it was still the defense industrial 
bases that remained most influential in the decisions for fighter purchases up to the end of 
the Cold War. The following examples of Europe’s fighter aircraft programs during the 
period 1960-1989 serve to illustrate the point. 
U.S. technological foothold in Europe commenced with the Republic F-84 fighter 
bomber in the early 1950s and was augmented yet further in the same decade with the 
Lockheed F-104G Starfighter. The Lockheed plane owed its existence to lessons learned 
in the Korean War, and the original F-104A was designed as a light-weight interceptor 
able to climb high and fast to arrive at a dogfight quickly and advantageously. However, 
it was among the first of the Mach 2 fighter aircraft of the 1950s and suffered from 
teething problems. Its high performance, limited range and stunted payload restricted the 
usefulness of the F-104C in the United States Air Force,62 but the aircraft, redesigned as a 
fighter bomber, saw extensive export sales. The highly aggressive and effective sales 
campaign mounted by the Lockheed organization contributed greatly to this export 
success. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway (and later Greece, 
Turkey, and Spain) all augmented their sub-sonic F-84-based tactical air forces at least 
partially with the Mach II fighter in the 1960’s and 70’s.63 The export version was largely 
a collaborative project, designed in the U.S. but constructed to some degree via offsets in 
several of the NATO countries. The aircraft also formed an operational means of NATO 
Massive Retaliation strategy (and later Flexible Response) whereby the fighter bomber 
was able to carry tactical nuclear weapons and thus share the nuclear role with the 
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continental allies and counteract French nuclear acquisition.64 This policy afforded the 
U.S. influence on the continent while also defining the revival of a European fighter 
production industry. In fact, one theory states that when the U.S. sold Germany the F-104 
in a joint project in 1960, it saved the German aerospace industry from ruin, causing 
concern in France and Britain over the shifting balance of power in continental defense 
industries.65 There were mixed reviews on the aircraft performance and safety record, 
especially in Germany, but the program nonetheless firmly established the U.S. defense 
aerospace industry on the continent and set the stage for further collaborative fighter 
projects.66  
While some countries continued to operate U.S.-made jets, certain European 
nations turned desire for independence from U.S. industry into several fighter jet projects, 
beginning with the FIAT G-91 project, through the Harrier and onto the Panavia 
MRCA/Tornado venture in 1968. Britain, Germany, and Italy teamed with the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada to pursue a common multi-role fighter while sharing a 
part of the research and development costs. Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium all 
withdrew from the program at an early date, citing too many compromises in the aircraft 
design and burgeoning cost projections as reasons. The remaining three countries 
wrangled over different conceptions of the aircraft’s role for some time, with Germany 
demanding a Close Air Support aircraft able to loiter over troops on the battlefield and 
Britain pushing for a fast swept-wing design to fly low and carry large amounts of 
ordnance. Italy required an air-to-air role which was less important to Germany and 
Britain. In the end, several versions were built and all suffered losses of capability to 
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satisfy the differing requirements of the partner countries.67 In essence, the Tornado was 
designed as a bomber to satisfy initial requirements, and later tried to become a fighter to 
satisfy further needs, which is widely viewed as the worst path to an effective air defense 
fighter.  
The Tornado nevertheless demonstrated that cooperation among the three 
remaining countries worked despite some divergence in views. The international 
company Panavia representing the three nations’ major aerospace firms conducted 
management oversight of the program, while the NATO organization NAMMA (NATO 
Multi-role Combat Aircraft Development and Production Management Agency) provided 
some governmental control. Industrial contracts were assigned based on percentages of 
total aircraft purchased, with relatively little disagreement among the partners.68 At the 
same time, the Tornado program demonstrated several trends in multinational defense 
cooperation during this era. For example, The Netherlands and Belgium both left the 
project after realizing the F-16 program promised not only greater multi-role capability, 
but better industrial opportunities for their smaller defense industries as well. In this 
sense, the Tornado program also embodied the split between smaller countries such as 
these and the larger European defense industrial powers. The limited transfer of 
technology from the U.S. to European countries in the F-16 program would have been 
insufficient to sustain the larger defense industries, thus compelling them to pursue their 
own programs.69  
By the 1980s, the Tornado enjoyed success throughout Europe, chiefly through 
multiple upgrade programs. It remained limited in capabilities, though, especially in the 
air-to-air role. This was due in large part to issues present at the outset of the program: 
design compromises and the comparative limits of European aerospace technology. 
Demonstrating the propensity of collaborative partners to continue together in future  
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ventures (an issue addressed further in a later chapter), the same countries with the 
addition of Spain decided to jointly pursue the design of a more capable fighter for the 
future, the Eurofighter of the 1990’s.70 
If the Tornado was the test bed, the Eurofighter was seen as the model endeavor 
for European defense integration, for better or worse. In the summer of 1985, Britain, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and France began talks about the next generation European fighter 
plane, then known as the European Fighter Aircraft, or EFA, especially needed by the 
West Germans to replace the F-4 Phantom and to deal with the relentless progress of 
Soviet fighter aviation in the final phase of the Cold War. The principle justifications for 
the project were to pursue the air-to-air capability lacking in the still-young Tornado, and 
to create jobs on the continent. Additionally, Europe’s defense aerospace industries 
recognized that unless they produced a true fourth-generation fighter akin to the F-16 or 
F-15, their aerospace engineers were in danger of permanent exclusion from the fighter 
jet field. France predictably left the program to pursue an autonomous carrier-capable 
plane with the air-to-ground capacity it had missed by bowing out of the Tornado 
program. The remaining partners, the U.K. in particular, reportedly felt that “four-way 
collaboration is already seen as difficult enough” without having the notoriously difficult 
French in the mix.71 Thus, the remaining partners willingly agreed on the requirement for 
a primarily air superiority jet, and after fixing on the appropriate industrial offsets 
decided to produce the aircraft together.  
Numerous reasons were cited for pursuing collaboration in the EFA project. The 
U.K. Ministry of Defense, for example, stated the cost savings to be 20% over 
autonomous production, which they remained capable of undertaking. Other views 
purveyed that the EFA was a logical continuation of the Tornado program, and the 
partners had no reason to seek independent products given the relative success of the 
Tornado. But perhaps the true reason for collaboration is found in the rejection of the 
U.S.-made F/A-18 Hornet 2000 as an alternative choice. The U.K. and Germany rejected 
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it for differing reasons, but the U.K. purportedly decided on the EFA before even 
learning of the Hornet option.72 This illustrates the preconceived initiative to exclude the 
U.S. from any part in the project in order to guard the fragile autonomy of the European 
defense industrial bases. What became the Eurofighter subsequently saw numerous 
delays and cost overruns before becoming operational in the four air forces over ten years 
behind schedule. It remains to be seen if the program can be considered a success or 
failure for European defense industries, but if survival equates to success then the goal 
was achieved.73 In fact as of summer 2006, all four participating countries boasted 
operational wings of the Eurofighter, with pilots lauding its initial capabilities while 
anticipating further upgrades.74 
To conclude this section, one can suggest that the health of defense industrial 
bases on both sides of the Atlantic had a major impact on Europe’s decisions to purchase 
fighter aircraft in the period leading to the end of the Cold War. Europe’s recovering 
economies allowed it to challenge American hegemony, which drove the U.S. to seek 
more transatlantic collaboration in order to preserve its foothold on the continent. The 
end of this period witnessed continuing American influence in the smaller countries 
which remained incapable of large scale production within their combat aircraft 
industries. The larger industrial powers continued to collaborate and maintained some 
degree of autonomy in the face of their larger alliance partner across the ocean. This 
relative stabilization of the defense industrial base power struggle would set the stage for 
further evolution in the post-Cold War era. 
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C. MILITARY INFLUENCE 
Two trends defined fighter design during the Cold War period when viewed from 
a capability perspective. First, U.S. desires delineated which aircraft NATO flew, either 
directly or indirectly. Second, the ever-present Soviet threat kept the pressure on all air 
forces to keep up with the latest in fighter capabilities. NATO’s push for rationalization, 
standardization, and especially interoperability (mostly espoused through U.S. calls for 
increased spending and capabilities in European militaries) ensured that each member 
state at least felt pressure to possess the latest in fighter capabilities. Until collaborative 
projects such as the Tornado arrived toward the end of the Cold War, European air forces 
consisted primarily of U.S.-made fighters, ensuring a fairly even distribution of 
capabilities.75 Even as Europe designed and built its own aircraft, though, U.S. 
technology and the professed requirements for its alliance partners (expressed through 
NATO) continued to shape the capabilities of fighters in European nations. Therefore, a 
study of fighter capabilities and their influence on European decisions to procure them in 
this time frame is tied directly to developments in America.  
From the defense spending boom of the 1950’s to the waning days of the Cold 
War, the perfection of weapons technology in fighter designs followed a linear path. Such 
aircraft capacities as increased range, speed, altitude, and loiter time owed themselves to 
advances in materials technology for jet engines, while all-weather and night capability 
coupled with more sophisticated electronic warfare suites resulted from a steady 
advancement in aerospace technology The materials in airframes steadily became lighter 
and made aircraft more maneuverable in the air-to-air realm, and, in the 1950s, computers 
first appeared which increased navigation accuracy and pilot-to-aircraft interfaces. 
Weapons capabilities also advanced steadily during this time, with precision guided air-
to-ground munitions and radar-guided air-to-air missiles (allowing for the first time a 
Beyond Visual Range, or BVR, capability in air combat) both reaching limited 
operational status and serving to define what “advanced” meant in fighter aviation. 
Even in the prosperous U.S., however, such advances in technology did not 
automatically find themselves into fighter wings because of the perennial guns or butter 
                                                 
75 Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), 123. 
32 
issues of democracy. Though the generous defense spending of the 1950’s generated 
large amounts of R and D funding and numerous different fighter projects, costs began to 
skyrocket in the course of the decade and air staff could no longer simply build a jet just 
because it was possible. In other words, technological feasibility had to bow before civil 
military realities. When the Kennedy administration took office in 1961 with its strategy 
of Flexible Response and its conventional warfare focus, the new Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara curtailed development costs through collaborative programs among 
the services. McNamara’s dream joint fighter, the TFX, which later became the F-111 
fighter-bomber, highlighted the problems of inter service rivalry and the dilemmas of 
aircraft procurement - it was not possible to satisfy all requirements for air combat and 
ground attack with one plane.76 By contrast, the joint Air Force/Navy fighter, the F-4 
Phantom II, proved a major success, putting the lie to criticism of McNamara once the 
aircraft saw extensive operations in both services.  
The F-4 was indicative of the U.S. turn away from jets that could go faster and 
higher toward cheaper, multi-role workhorses that satisfied numerous design 
requirements. However, the Vietnam War highlighted serious limitations in strategy, as 
there was little allowance for the kind of aerial combat as actually unfolded in the skies 
over North Vietnam in 1966 or those over Egypt and Syria in 1967. In the case of the in 
the F-4’s air-to-air capability versus the more nimble Soviet made MiG-17 and especially 
the MiG-21 (to say nothing of the fate of the Republic F-105) a sea change took place in 
U.S. fighter doctrine with implications into the 21st century. This change was accelerated 
by the failure of the F-111 in an operational role as a dogfighter. The sum of experience 
of 1964-1967 led directly to the development of the F-16 and F-15 as air superiority 
fighters. This coincided with the European Tornado project and, as such, heralded a 
divergence in transatlantic fighter capabilities that mirrored trans-Atlantic realities in the 
decade of the 1970s.  
Many European air forces were flying the F-104 when the U.S. Air Force adopted 
the F-4 as its mainline fighter in the early-1960s. The F104G had been conceived within 
the strategy of massive retaliation to give the continental Europeans a say in NATO 
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nuclear strategy as well as to adapt to the operational requirements of NATO’s central 
front. However, the adoption of the F-4 led to its adaptation by other NATO countries, 
not the least of which was the Federal Republic of Germany. However, when the time 
came to replace the F-104’s, the tendency to follow U.S. trends met with increasing 
political desire for European industrial autonomy. This political process divided those 
who would choose the largely air-to-ground option in the European Tornado and those 
who opted in the 1970s for greater maneuverability and air-to-air capability with the 
American F-16. As previously addressed, the larger European industrial powers opted for 
the Tornado, in part to add vitality to their aerospace industries, but this policy severely 
limited their air-to-air capabilities in tactical and operational realms. Meanwhile, the 
countries that opted for the F-16 later saw huge leaps in its capability as an air-to-ground 
fighter. As such the evolution of the aircraft as a true multi-role aircraft put the nations 
still operating U.S. equipment at a distinct advantage as the cold war ended. Certain 
European nations attempted to make up for its shortfalls with a counter-air emphasis in 
the Eurofighter design of the mid-1980s, but the tactical gap between U.S. aircraft and 
their European counterparts had become considerable in the interval.  
If the trend in overall airframe capacities showed an advantage toward those 
operating U.S. equipment at the end of the Cold War, aircraft upgrades and programs 
envisioned for the future still demonstrated Europe’s desire to keep up with fighter forces 
in the air. At the end of the Cold War, roughly one third of European fighter squadrons 
were capable of operating at night and in adverse weather, while around half could 
engage an enemy in the air using BVR weapons.77 Nearly all planned to continue 
progress in these areas to match the U.S. in the near future. F-16 users planned major 
upgrades to the Mid Life Update (MLU) aircraft and AMRAAM missiles, while 
Germany sought to improve its F-4 fleet with radar missiles as well. The French had 
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Tornado, which equipped roughly a third of European squadrons at the end of the Cold 
War, was close to the end of its operational life, but the Eurofighter promised further 
tactical advantages in the air for participating nations.78  
Thus, when seeking the degree to which tactical and operational capabilities 
mattered to European decision-makers in the purchase of fighter aircraft during the Cold 
War, one finds the answer distinctly mixed with that of defense industrial base, political 
and economic issues. The progress from one collaborative fighter to the next and mid-life 
upgrade programs to these jets indicate that tactical and operational requirements of 
air/land battle mattered to makers of policy. At the same time, however, the Tornado 
demonstrated the willingness to compromise capability for multi-national cooperation in 
the Alliance and civil military spheres. An excellent insight on political, economic, and 
military factors all interacting to shape decisions in this period is found in 1975 as four 
governments sought replacements for their F-104Gs. What became the “deal of the 
century” would exemplify where transatlantic trends in fighter procurement were headed. 
 
D. THE F-16 ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 
When Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands signed the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) to purchase the F-16 Fighting Falcon from American contractor 
General Dynamics on July 21, 1975, NATO saw the birth of perhaps the vanguard 
program on collaborative purchases of fighter aircraft. While entire books have been 
written on the sales program alone,79 the student of this phenomenon can induce lessons 
from many different aspects of the European Partner Group (EPG) program, as it came to 
be called. When analyzed from the perspective of development, sales, production, 
maintenance, upgrades, and interoperability, the F-16 program serves as a model for 
future programs. In addition, the issues that swayed governments to choose the aircraft 
over its European competitors demonstrate the interaction of politics, industry, and the 
military in major defense purchases.  
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The development and sale of the F-16 represented the first time a fighter was 
designed for primary operation in both the U.S. and allied air forces. This contrasted with 
the previously discussed F-104 program, for example, which was originally designed for 
the U.S. Air Force but saw limited use in America.80 When the USAF chose the General 
Dynamics F-16 in early 1975, the U.S. government strongly lobbied the four European 
countries in the market for a new fighter at the time (the EPG countries) to select the 
same aircraft.81 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger glimpsed the potential political and 
economic advantages of such a sale, and as soon as the four countries expressed interest 
an unprecedented document arrived in all four capitals promising deals of collaborative 
development, technology sharing, logistical support and industrial offsets in the event of 
a sale.82 Such a use of aircraft for alliance cohesion fit well within the renewed U.S. 
emphasis on Europe in the face of the defeat in Indochina. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim 
Schlesinger joined the strong U.S. push to sell the F-16. He espoused the benefits in 
interoperability and standardization of the four countries that flew the same aircraft. 
Defense ministers of the four countries were treated to aircraft demonstrations and 
numerous briefings about capability and cost, while discussing the offset percentage of 
manufacturing that could be accomplished at European factories. In the event of a sale, 
European companies would build 10% of General Dynamics’ F-16’s for delivery to the 
USAF, 40% of the EPG products, and 15% of the exports to other countries, and a list 
already indicated 66 European firms considered as possible subcontractors.83 Clearly the 
Americans had strong interests in a European procurement of the plane and were 
executing a sophisticated sales plan fraught with forethought. 
Reasons abounded to choose the F-16, but it was by no means a predetermined 
decision. All four nations flew the F-104G together and had experience and familiarity in 
purchasing American fighters. But many other variables played into their decisions. 
Interoperability, cost, capability, competing aircraft choices, Alliance unity, domestic 
politics, technology sharing, work share agreements and pressure to buy European 
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products all played into the EPG’s decisions. The two other candidates were the French-
made Dassault-Breguet F1/M53 and the Swedish Saab-Scania Viggen 37E, both capable 
fighters in their own right, but clearly inferior when faced with the capability and cost 
advantages of the F-16. A NATO Steering Committee conducted a comparison study of 
the three aircraft and found the F-16 superior in almost all categories including combat 
radius, maneuverability, and weapons load capacity as well as the critical economic 
issues of fuel efficiency and projected maintenance costs. Some sources estimated an F-
16 would pay for itself over its lifetime given the fuel savings when compared to the 
other candidates. The Swedish and French programs involved older aircraft, thus 
affording the F-16 a seven year advantage in technology which proved critical given the 
improvements in computing potential occurring in the 1970’s. Clearly the U.S. option 
touted the more capable jet, but naturally other political and economic factors entered 
into play.84 
Predictably, diplomatic issues both internal and transatlantic surfaced that would 
affect the purchase decisions. For example, one element which shaped the EPG countries’ 
assessment of the F-16 was its lack of a radar-guided missile and all-weather capability 
(perhaps its only weakness), and U.S. political issues prevented a clean solution. The 
parallel F-15 program needed to justify its existence to Congress by touting advantages 
over the F-16, those being radar missiles and all-weather capability. Thus, the EPG 
countries were informed off-the-record that the F-16 could be upgraded in these areas, 
and the gap would be closed when the F-15 program was firmly established in the eyes of 
Congress.  
In NATO Europe, familiar issues echoed in the halls of legislatures and defense 
ministries. It was doubtful if Denmark’s defense budget would be large enough to 
commit to such a purchase; Norway would not obligate itself unless the other three 
countries joined; and internal political turmoil ruled in Belgium as pressure mounted 
from the French-speaking faction of government to buy the Dassault product. The Dutch 
considered the French jet for reasons of European unity, but abandoned the idea after 
tiring of French business practices and lack of progress in the program. A positive factor 
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for the Europeans involved the U.S. commitment to buy at least 650 of its own aircraft, 
which would drive down the cost of the program and increase European confidence at the 
prospect of U.S. Air Force jets stationed on the continent alongside EPG models. The 
French were unable to commit to such numbers for Mirages in their own air force and 
consequently fell out of favor with the European nations looking to purchase new 
fighters.85  
Ultimately, EPG countries dismissed the two other aircraft and selected the F-16 
after a year of intense deliberation. The decision to forgo European unity should not be 
discounted for its significance. A European fighter certainly remained a possibility for a 
slightly higher price, but the losses in aircraft capability, industrial offsets, and political 
clout with the strongest alliance partner were simply not worth the savings.86 It was a 
decision from which they would reap benefits for decades after. 
After the EPG countries (which later became known as the European Participating 
Air Forces, or EPAF) took delivery of the first F-16’s in 1978, the advantages of 
producing and maintaining the aircraft in their own countries continued. Belgium and the 
Netherlands both produced the aircraft within their borders, and each country reaped 
industrial benefits through ongoing depot-level maintenance, spare parts manufacture, 
and logistics support. But most important, the prospects of operating and upgrading the 
same aircraft together throughout its lifecycle offered more advantages than originally 
foreseen by the countries involved. Unlike its predecessors, the easily upgradeable F-16 
was designed efficiently from the outset to incorporate changing technologies, a capacity 
not lost on the export versions. As the U.S. Air Force upgraded from the original A/B 
models to the C/D version of the jet, the Europeans incorporated the OCU (Operational 
Capabilities Upgrade) program into their own versions to allow them to keep pace. Later, 
as the U.S. models touted increasingly sophisticated avionics, the EPAF readily upgraded 
their existing jets to the F-16 MLU (Mid-Life Upgrade) version, which essentially 
equalized the capabilities of U.S. and European models. This required revising U.S. 
technology transfer laws, a sensitive undertaking but one decidedly worth the security  
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risks given the political and economic gains. The MLU program, in keeping with the 
spirit of the F-16 sale, is praised as a success in cooperative procurement working toward 
the goal of improved combat capability.87 
Taken in perspective three decades later, perhaps the greatest ongoing benefit of 
the EPAF F-16 program has been the continued advantages gleaned from operating the 
same aircraft over the years and such benefits for alliance cohesion and the shared human 
and technological aspects of NATO. The ministries of defense, air staff, and airmen of 
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands have shared knowledge and operating 
procedures since the program’s inception, which has synergistically improved their 
collective combat potential over the years. The European Fighter Weapons Instructor 
Training (FWIT) program has operated under the umbrella of U.S. Air Force F-16 tactics 
and training, ensuring maximal participation and cooperation between the four countries 
and the U.S. with the common goal of increasing the lethality of the weapons system. 
While the Kosovo conflict raised many concerns about the lack of interoperability of 
NATO forces in combat, the EPAF F-16 operators were already standing by with their 
solution. What criticism was offered to European F-16 users involved a lack of capability 
compared to U.S. versions, but the post-Kosovo upgrade to the MLU version (previously 
planned but not yet implemented) effectively nullified many of the shortfalls. Ongoing 
operational exercises and mutual avionics upgrades (often in conjunction with a new U.S. 
capability) between the countries continue to maximize the advantages of interoperability 
found in the EPAF program.88 
One can thus summarize that the F-16 sale of the late-1970s to Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway exemplified an innovative, ambitious and 
successful process on many different fronts. Political factors played minor roles in the 
process while industrial and military advantages gained in the program seemed to weigh 
more heavily on national governments. Due to the timing of aircraft replacement 
programs, the resurgence of defense industrial bases on the continent, and a desire for 
European autonomy in other countries, only the four relatively small EPAF countries 
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entered into the collaborative program, and it demonstrated the shifting balance of power 
in transatlantic defense cooperation. America was no longer guaranteed military 
hardware sales to European clients, but industrial cooperation and a superior product 
ensured continuing U.S. influence on the continent. According to one senior General 
Dynamics executive, “If we had not offered them a satisfactory co-production deal, they 
would have bought either from the French or the Swedish, despite a higher price and 
lower technology.”89 The F-16 competition has been hailed as a “reasonably good 
example of the best way to develop expensive weapons for the Alliance: parallel 
development, competition, selection of the best and then shared production.”90  
The F-16 program demonstrated how the complex interaction of politics, industry, 
and military influence could merge in a program that became the paradigm of 
collaborative weapons ventures of its day. The F-16 continues to enjoy success and 
demonstrate the viability of an American product that promotes transatlantic cooperation 
on all fronts in the 21st century, even amid the shifts of the post-Cold War political 
environment. Greater transatlantic frictions and a growing concentration and nationalism 
in aerospace industries of the U.S. and Europe reflect a very different set of political and 
economic factors than operated in 1975. Nonetheless, the virtues of the F-16 program for 
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III.  EUROPEAN FIGHTER PROCUREMENT 1989-PRESENT 
The end of the Cold War inevitably raised questions regarding the path of 
U.S./European relations and such affected the matter of men and machines in the air at 
the end of the 20th century. With the demand for a peace dividend as well as greater 
concentration in the aerospace sector and a closer alignment of the industrial policies of 
the U.S. and the European Union, the future of defense procurement remained quite 
uncertain on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO itself moved from collective defense in the 
narrow sense of Article V to embrace the ideals of Article III and IV of the Washington 
Treaty. Vanished was the horizon to the east filled with threatening clouds of Warsaw 
Pact aircraft, as an air threat seemed a distant possibility. Defense industries in both the 
U.S. and Europe continued to merge, and the absence of a common threat empowered 
market forces amid globalization and made nonsense out of the seemingly compelling 
procurement policies of the 1970s. The imperative of tactical and operational capabilities 
took a back seat to budget priorities as governments concerned themselves more with the 
inevitable reduction of defense budgets, especially in Europe. Some time passed before 
the full course of the conflict in the Balkans began to underscore the continuing need for 
modern weapons in the air. Following NATO’s air war in Kosovo in 1999 and conflicts 
arising from the attacks of September 11, 2001, cutting edge aerospace power and 
coalition warfare returned to public debate. The modern fighter jet continued to play a 
strategic and tactical role as a symbol of the willingness of western democracies to 
defend themselves in the era of strategic turmoil that attended the 1990s and the new 
century.  
Most fighter aircraft procurement decisions in Europe since 1989 can be tied to 
such pre-Cold War programs as the Eurofighter, dubbed the Typhoon as it entered service 
in the present decade. The EPAF F-16 countries relied on their existing aircraft and such 
ongoing upgrades as the MLU to remain capable in the combat environment. As of this 
writing in 2006, numerous NATO governments (including the original EPAF members) 
are faced with difficult decisions regarding replacement of their existing fighters. This 
chapter examines the state of European fighter procurement from 1989 to present through 
an analysis of political, economic, and military factors, while seeking to determine which 
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factors weighed (and continue to weigh) on decision-makers faced with replacing their 
combat aircraft in the post-Cold War environment. The chapter finishes with an 
examination of fighters currently available for purchase in today’s “post-post-Cold War” 
world and how the aforementioned factors interact to shape decisions for those now in the 
replacement market. 
 
A. POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
As suggested above, the political landscape has changed drastically since the end 
of the Cold War and numerous diplomatic, strategic and economic dynamics have arisen 
to influence decision-makers in the procurement of materiel. Domestic and international 
political factors influence these decisions both within NATO and outside the Alliance. 
While one cannot always pinpoint the degree to which politics affect the respective 
procurement choices, general analysis of the factors that affect such materiel purchases 
can aid the analysis at hand.  
 
1. Transatlantic Relations 
At the risk of oversimplification, one can suggest that transatlantic relations 
generally remained positive throughout the 1990’s. Worries as to whether NATO would 
survive after the Cold War were assuaged with its enlargement eastward and the 
consequent new-found purpose.91 The “unipolar moment” raised concerns in continental 
Europe especially about American free market and neo-conservative hegemony and 
abuse of power as the lone remaining superpower. But despite certain differences in 
views regarding the use of force on the two sides of the Atlantic, the NATO allies 





                                                  
91 See Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) and Celleste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and 
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54 (Autumn 2000): 705-735. 
43 
unification of Germany; the end of the Cold War; the waging of the 1st Gulf War; and 
finally, the successful diplomacy to limit the ill effects of the break up of Yugoslavia.92 
But the close of decade brought signs of growing divergence. 
Disparities in operational military capabilities highlighted in the air over Kosovo 
in 1999 resulted in a marginalized decision-making process and little sharing of U.S. 
intelligence. This led some European nations to resent the perceived U.S. political and 
strategic dominance in the conflict and fostered American distrust in the reliability and 
effectiveness of its allies on the battlefield. In 2001, numerous policies of the Bush 
administration fueled European concerns of an American abandonment of multilateralism 
and the junking of the transatlantic bond. These political disagreements seemed to ossify 
following the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. decision to invade Afghanistan despite rejecting 
most aid offered by its NATO allies as Article V of the Washington Treaty was invoked 
for the first time.93 Instead, European forces were employed under the new tenet of the 
“mission defines the coalition,” which appeared to dispense with the kind of alliance 
statecraft that had been present with previous U.S. administrations. The United States 
National Security Strategy of September 2002 confirmed that America would strike 
preemptively and without U.N. mandates, without the help of its alliance partners if 
necessary, to defend itself from attack.94 The phrase “the mission defines the coalition” 
and “coalitions of the willing” came to symbolize U.S. disregard of its allies’ concerns 
and consultation across the Atlantic Ocean. This policy was naturally ill-received in 
certain continental European governments and the transatlantic relationship suffered 
especially in the period 2002-2004. The European Security Strategy of December 2003 
echoed essentially the same security threats but emphasized tackling problems under 
U.N. mandates with maximum allied participation.95 
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The well-publicized fissure between the U.S. and certain European countries 
(notably France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg) following the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in April of 2003 served to underscore the fragile nature of transatlantic relations. 
Important NATO members clearly were not prepared to offer unconditional support to 
their larger alliance partner (unlike the days following the 9/11 attacks) and America 
disregarded their importance. Other political issues further deteriorated relations, 
including U.S. refusal to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Kyoto Treaties, U.S. 
treatment of prisoners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the European Union arms 
embargo on China, and trade disputes involving Microsoft and Boeing to name a few.96 
In many ways, however, the “rift” over Iraq was exaggerated by certain figures and 
movements eager to pursue their respective domestic political goals and the healing 
process began quickly (on the surface at least) despite certain media and limited public 
opinion otherwise.97 State visits to Europe in the beginning of the second Bush 
administration in 2005 emphasized the renewed importance of the transatlantic bond, and 
the collective diplomatic effort to diffuse the nuclear situation with Iran of that year 
illustrated the inevitable and welcome mending of fences.98 Also, as the U.S. continues 
military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan as of 2006, it has placed greater 
emphasis on the importance of its coalition partners to achieve vital security goals.99 And 
despite ongoing disputes, the U.S. and the European Union remain the world’s strongest 
trading partners (totaling $1.1 trillion or more annually)100 with similar security 
interests.101 Common sense seems to have reasserted itself after the spasm of 2002-2003.  
To be sure the transatlantic tides have seen stormy ebbs and flows since the dawn 
of the 21st century, but views on both sides holds that the transatlantic bond at least has 
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the capacity to recover from recent difficulties.102 However, one must not discount the 
continuing effects of the divisive Iraq conflict, both across the Atlantic and in Europe 
itself, as well as lingering differences on aforementioned issues. Clearly there is still 
work to be done to fix the damage. For instance, Pierre Lellouche, outgoing president of 
NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, with an eye to the NATO peace enforcement and 
security building operation in Afghanistan of late-2006 remarked: 
I must admit that I am concerned about the fate of the Atlantic Alliance… 
I have my concerns, first of all because our American friends and allies do 
not give me the impression of having truly chosen a direction for the 
future of the Alliance…Unilateralism on one side, verbal incantation on 
the other, the outcome could be tragic, as we are now seeing in 
Afghanistan where, if we are not careful, NATO, which is now covering 
all of the Afghan territory, risks being placed in a difficult situation 
militarily by the Taliban due to a lack of sufficient resources in the 
field.103 
Thus, resentment and concern undoubtedly lingers in European minds, but to which 
extent remains unclear. The construction of Europe and especially a kind of Fortress 
Europe mentality as concerns industrial policy can perhaps inter-mingle with the more 
general geo-strategic stresses and strains of the new century. Such phenomena operate in 
the purchase of fighter aircraft on a multi-national basis.  
 
2. The Rise of a European Defense Arm 
The end of the Cold War witnessed a shift in the transatlantic military balance as 
the European Union gradually acquired more foreign policy and defense autonomy since 
1991. This policy has primarily been due to: 1.) the need to redistribute the economic 
burden of providing for Europe’s security and 2. ) conflict in the Balkans required more 
European military force (as credibility to back up diplomacy) and the autonomy to use it 
outside of NATO in order to legitimize their diplomatic efforts in the region.104 Also, an 
increasing European role in world affairs and growing assertiveness vis-à-vis the United 
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States contributed to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).105 At St. Malo in 
1998, Britain and France decreed that the EU must have the “capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”106 What thus became the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was officially welcomed at NATO’s 
Washington Summit in 1999, where the allies agreed that a stronger European defense 
would contribute to the “vitality of the Alliance in the 21st Century.” The EU would 
concentrate on the Petersberg Tasks – humanitarian search and rescue missions, crisis 
management tasks including peace enforcement, and environmental protection – while 
benefiting from NATO assets and capabilities through the so-called Berlin Plus 
agreements of 2003.107 U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously declared U.S. 
support for European defense integration on condition that the “3 D’s” were avoided: no 
Diminution of NATO, no Discrimination of non-EU members of NATO, and no 
Duplication of NATO responsibilities.108 NATO and the EU have cooperated on 
numerous defense issues, notably the advancement of European military capabilities 
through the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) of 2001 and the NATO-EU 
Capability Group of 2003. The EU formed the European Defense Agency (EDA) in July 
of 2004 to “focus on the development of defense capabilities, research, acquisition, and 
armaments.”109 However, it is an organization facing tremendous challenges to becoming 
efficient and effective. 
The EDA exercises scant influence over EU member states in the area of defense 
procurement despite efforts otherwise. This is best illustrated by the attempt in November 
2005 to establish a more open market for defense equipment, which typically was 
exempted from EU market rules under Article 296 of the EU Treaty. A Code of Conduct 
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on Defense Procurement was signed by 22 of the 25 member states which essentially 
required open competition between the participating member states for all defense-related 
equipment. The goal of the document and the EDA is a common European Defense and 
Equipment Market (EDEM) where all members would have equal access to defense-
related contracts. However, the code remains strictly voluntary and states that 
collaborative programs and issues of “pressing operational urgency” and “compelling 
reasons of national security would justify a nation purchasing equipment on its own 
accord.”110 The implications for large-scale procurement such as fighter aircraft are clear, 
given the economic factors present and “traditional reticence of member states to give up 
national prerogatives in defense matters.”111 The Code of Conduct and its inherent 
limitations illustrates the uphill struggle the EDA will face to coordinate defense 
procurement in the European Union. 
While statements or rhetoric from NATO, the EU, and the U.S. would imply all 
sides benefiting with the rise of a European defense arm, this remains a simplified view. 
Certain camps maintain that Europe is attempting to counter U.S. dominance in global 
affairs by becoming a powerful political counterweight, even at the expense of NATO.112 
Some suggest Europe’s weakened stance beside the U.S. in Kosovo led to the 
development of ESDP for autonomy beyond the so called Petersberg Tasks. Perhaps the 
next conflict will see Europe fighting as the EU, an equal partner to the U.S. but not 
constrained by the American-led NATO.113 Others maintain that a defense arm of the 
European Union is merely the most efficient way to integrate militaries and industrial 
bases and in fact, it benefits the U.S. as much as Europe. Regardless, the rise of the ESDP 
and EU agencies such as the EDA acted as both an avenue and additional source of 
pressure to improve military capabilities on the continent and to purchase more European 
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equipment. However, the limitations of the EDA’s influence promises to keep American 
hardware an option to decision-makers for some years to come granted the heterogeneous 
nature of Europe even today and the multilayered links visible even in the procurement of 
aerospace materiel.  
 
3. NATO and its Influence 
Most political issues in the days since the Cold War have played out in NATO’s 
conference rooms. Burden sharing, perhaps the most popular, yet generally 
misunderstood alliance-related subject, scarcely disappeared with the end of the Berlin 
Wall, as many European leaders likely wished; rather, this phenomenon assumed greater 
importance in the 1990’s.114 With the U.S. harboring a sense of less responsibility for 
European security, there was further impetus for Europe to increase its defense 
expenditures. The focus became not only Euro spent, but the actual capabilities needed to 
meet emerging security threats such as those in Balkans.115 Criticism was leveled at 
Europe concerning the efficiency of its defense budgets, as figures showed the same 
countries NATO rebuked for deficient capabilities spending significantly more on 
personnel and infrastructure, at the expense of military equipment and training. In 2006, 
NATO continues to push its European member states to spend more on modernization in 
addition to research and development (R and D) to improve their capabilities. The U.S. 
continues to shoulder a great deal of the R and D burden, spending up to six times more 
than all of Europe combined.116 The “capabilities gap” that opened between the U.S. and 
Europe in the decade following the end of the Cold War (discussed in detail later in 
subsequent sections) still exists and NATO consequently continues to push its members 
to upgrade their forces. The Comprehensive Political Guidance from the Riga Summit of 
2006 stresses the need for equipment which is “deployable, sustainable, interoperable, 
and useable.” It also adds the importance of the “effective” use of funds for investment, 
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and the “greatest practicable interoperability and standardization among allies.”117 This 
pressure certainly weighs on decision-makers when asking what capabilities are 
necessary in their future fighters.  
 
Table 1.   Defense Expenditures as % of GDP 
Based on constant prices 
 
 
NATO’s decision to enlist new members (undertaken in 1997 and realized in 
1999) was driven more so by geo-political factors connected with the fate of Europe in 
the 20th century as opposed to a red versus blue threat as in 1961 or 1983. The nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe required the extension further east of security and freedom to 
efface the legacy of the Warsaw Pact system.118 In addition to such preconditions as a 
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“functioning democratic political system” and “democratic civil-military relations,” 
prospective members were obliged to have the “ability to make a military contribution to 
the Alliance.”119 For those that acceded to the Alliance, relatively weak economies and 
meager defense budgets opened the door to numerous issues of political loyalty played 
out in their defense procurements. Of the three nations who joined in 1999, only Poland 
was able to undertake a major purchase of fighter aircraft, but it demonstrated the sort of 
political pressure placed on leaders through such a highly visible and significant 
endeavor. 
France, Sweden, and the U.S. all lobbied heavily through their respective fighter 
aircraft industries to win the contract in Poland to replace its aging fleet of Soviet fighters 
with sophisticated Western models. What became a heated competition in 2001-2003 to 
land a lucrative deal was fraught with more political undertones than Poland hoped, as 
the rift between “Old Europe” and the U.S. played out in their wooing of a new ally. In 
January of 2003 Poland signed the “letter of eight,” promising support for an invasion of 
Iraq. When later that year it signed to purchase 48 F-16 Block 52’s from the U.S. 
company Lockheed Martin, France and Germany were particularly critical of Poland’s 
apparent lean toward the U.S. as the most vocal abstainers from the Iraq War. Poland also 
stood accused by France of disloyalty to European “industrial and foreign policy 
decisions,” which potentially threatened its entry into the European Union (it joined in 
2004 regardless). Later, as Poland pulled its troops from Iraq in 2005, questions arose in 
Poland’s legislature as to whether the U.S. consequently slowed offset deals in 
conjunction with the F-16 sale.120 Some have suggested the aircraft deal from the 
beginning was directly tied to Poland’s commitment of troops to Iraq, and while this is 
unlikely it remains difficult to disprove.121 Poland, regardless, has resented being put in  
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the difficult position of choosing between feuding allies and maintains that the $3.5 
billion F-16 deal with its accompanying $6 billion in potential offset agreements was 
solely an economic and strategic decision, not for political alignment.122  
Poland serves as the most visible example of the political slants found in newer 
NATO members’ procurement decisions. Many smaller nations with significantly less 
capable air forces are feeling NATO’s pressure to upgrade their capabilities despite 
meager defense budgets. Bulgaria is considering both F/A-18 E/F’s and F-16’s from the 
U.S. as well as the Swedish Gripen for a fighter purchase in the next two years.123 
Hungary and the Czech Republic recently decided to lease Gripen fighters with an option 
to buy, no doubt to the consternation of U.S officials. Pressure to be interoperable with 
NATO’s most influential member is part of the U.S. industry’s lobbying campaign for 
these potential customers and future coalition partners.124 Newer NATO nations also 
seem to lean toward the U.S. in other procurement decisions as well, such as their choice 
of the U.S.-made C-17 cargo plane over the Airbus A400M. Of the thirteen nations who 
recently signed to purchase the C-17 together through a NATO agreement, nine joined in 
2004 and one (Poland) joined in 1999.125 Economics played a large role in their decisions 
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4. Domestic Politics 
Political issues on the home front of NATO democracies have affected 
procurement decisions as much or more than external pressures. Logically, external 
issues played out domestically as well, with such subjects as the Iraq War and European 
integration dividing opinions on the domestic scene, often determining political futures in 
themselves. Additionally, the peace dividend and falling defense budgets gave rise to 
other factions in European politics. The diminished threat of great power conflict meant 
budgets could be funneled more toward social programs, and labor and demographic 
problems took on even more importance than before. Spending on defense, especially for 
programs aimed at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, was scrutinized in European 
legislatures as never before, and political capital spent on defense-related issues became a 
rarity, especially before conflicts in the Balkans materialized. The necessity to even 
replace existing fighter aircraft entered the debate, with mixed reactions. Funneling scant 
public funds into social programs which would guarantee more political support from a 
war-wary public seemed a viable option to many. This policy would involve posturing for 
a future air force that concentrates more on humanitarian missions and less on the 
expensive technology required to maintain viable fighter programs.127 For example, the 
Social Democratic Party in Denmark recently proposed replacing their highly capable F-
16 fleet with combat helicopters.128 While most domestic political issues will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is safe to say they continue to play a large role in 
procurement decisions. 
In sum, political influence both domestic and external has certainly wielded 
influence in the decision to purchase fighters since the end of the Cold War, but it is 
difficult to tell to which degree. NATO has pressured its members to keep up capabilities, 
and the European Union has pressured its members to remain militarily capable yet 
independent in the presence of U.S. demands. The U.S. has pushed its European allies to 
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buy American equipment or at least to equip themselves to remain capable and 
interoperable coalition partners or risk exclusion from future conflicts. Internally, 
European defense budgets have been scrutinized as never before, but in the end most 
countries that are in need of fighter replacements are currently in the market, including 
the smaller militaries to the East. The question on decision-makers’ minds is not 
“whether” to buy fighters, but “What?” and “From whom?” with the latter question the 
most likely influenced by political factors. As is evident in the following section, political 
pressures may have led governments to increase capabilities and seek improved fighter 
aircraft, but this process has been largely implemented through dynamics between 
respective defense industrial bases.  
 
B. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASES 
In Europe there are also multiple national defence industries, supported as 
often for reasons of national independence and prestige as for reasons of 
effectiveness. Taken together, the result has unavoidably been duplication 
of effort and industry, lack of coordination in policies, and higher costs — 
all of which make it impossible for Europe to match US advances in 
technology development and defence procurement.129 
NATO review, Autumn 2002.  
The end of the Cold War prompted similar phenomena in the defense industrial 
bases (DIBs) on both sides of the Atlantic, but on a much faster scale in the United 
States. Smaller defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic necessitated industrial 
consolidation, but Europe was hampered by national priorities and fragmentation (and 
thus lagged the U.S. in this arena for many years). Currently, most theories hold that 
further transatlantic cooperation by defense firms will benefit both sides, with militaries 
becoming more capable and DIBs being strengthened as a consequence. However, there 
remain barriers to this approach on both sides. The U.S. is reluctant to share its 
technology and give up any industrial edge, and it possesses some very key advantages. 
European nations still would prefer to consolidate and create a DIB rival to the U.S. in  
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the image of Airbus standing up to Boeing. A large question thus remains as to whether 
further cooperation will occur across the Atlantic, or if it will remain a bipolar state of 
affairs.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States witnessed an excess 
number of defense firms and declining demand on the customer side (i.e. the Pentagon). 
Defense companies were faced with seeking new markets, diversifying into the civilian 
sector, consolidating with other firms, or going out of business. The only means of 
survival for most firms was to merge, and market forces thus fueled the rapid 
concentration of the U.S. defense industry. The Pentagon recently determined that the top 
50 defense suppliers of the 1980’s became the top five in 2003.130 The American scene 
evolved in the 1990’s into several behemoth defense companies which saw less 
competition and could spread R and D costs over a higher number of contracts. By the 
end of the decade, the U.S. defense industrial base could run circles around its European 
counterparts from an efficiency standpoint, and this prompted action across the 
Atlantic.131 
Europe’s defense industrial bases reflected their fragmented nature and 
governmental desires to guard both national autonomy and defense-related jobs for much 
of the 1990’s.132 Criticism has been leveled at France for slowing European progress 
during this period through its policies of industrial protection,133 but all European 
governments employed protectionism to some degree in this sector.134 In 1998, fears of a 
streamlined American defense industry dominating the world market alarmed Europe and 
with industry leading the way, they followed the American example and began 
aggressive cross-border consolidation of the DIBs. This action was initially absent of any 
governmental urging or guidance, but after the launch of ESDP in 1999, European 
governments began to look to the EU for help in improving their capabilities and 
consolidating demand. This eventually led to the creation of the European Defense 
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Agency and European Defense Equipment Market (EDEM).135 European firms clearly 
feared loss of influence in the face of Americans, as evidenced by a joint statement in 
June, 2004 from the CEO’s of Europe’s three largest defense firms stating that European 
governments and industry do not “wish to see indigenous defense technology overtaken 
or dependence on foreign technologies become a necessity.” But the increased 
involvement of political agencies has prompted questions of additional European motives 
for consolidation, notably the EU’s desire to act autonomously from the U.S. in military 
actions. Thus, consolidation would serve not only to compete with U.S. industry, but to 
decrease European dependence on U.S. products in their militaries.136  
European defense industrial consolidation began in January 1999 in the United 
Kingdom when General Electric Company (GEC) merged with British Aerospace to 
become BAE Systems, currently the top defense company on the continent. More 
significantly, the privatization of France’s Aérospatiale and Matra systems morphed into 
a multi-national consortium that combined aerospace companies in all major European 
industrial nations to become the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company 
(EADS). Today EADS and BAE systems or their subsidiaries are responsible for most 
defense-related equipment produced in Europe, with EADS also heavily involved in the 
airline industry (through Airbus) and space ventures such as the Galileo project.137 After 
the formation of these two titans, however, it was soon clear that “Fortress Europe,” no 
matter how much it consolidated, still faced significant obstacles in the face of 
competition across the Atlantic. 
An extensive study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently 
found that national interests and industry protection continue to dominate the European 
defense market, despite attempts at reform.138 Policies of juste retour, or “programs 
divided up not by engineering or economic logic but by political expediency” still rule 
the defense industry and cause significant barriers to restructuring. The report 
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recommends ceding autonomy to the European Defense Agency in matters of defense 
acquisition in order to further rationalize demand and prevent the inefficiencies 
associated with shielding national industries from competition.139 As previously 
discussed, there are inherent limits in the EDA’s current approach to rationalizing 
demand as well, leaving national governments free to protect defense products as they see 
fit.  
In July of 1998, Europe’s six largest industrial powers (Germany, France, UK, 
Italy, Spain, and Sweden) signed a letter of intent (LoI) which later became the 
Framework Agreement (and still later the EDA), promising greater cross-border 
cooperation in defense acquisition. But even with this “rationalization” of Europe’s 
defense industries, the six LoI countries represent 90 percent of Europe’s defense 
industrial capabilities and 98 percent of its R and D spending, yet still spend roughly one 
sixth of the U.S. total on R and D.140 It is important to note that these six countries 
represent Europe’s autonomous capability to design and produce fighter aircraft. This is 
telling in two respects. Firstly, without further cooperation in the EU, Europe’s non-LoI 
countries (the smaller industrial nations) are somewhat excluded from the process of 
producing fighter aircraft, forcing them to look to America for options. Secondly, the R 
and D figures demonstrate that even the six LoI nations will likely fall behind the U.S. in 
technological capacity unless cooperation is sought across the ocean as well. The UK was 
the first to realize this and act upon it. 
In 1994, British Aerospace teamed with Northrop Gruman to bid on the nascent 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project and following the rejection of their design teamed with 
Lockheed Martin to collaborate on the winning bid.141 Today, BAE Systems (formally 
British Aerospace) is the number two contractor beside Lockheed Martin in the JSF 
venture, the largest foreign firm in the project with over $1 billion invested. In addition, 
BAE Systems recently purchased United Defense Industries for $4.1 billion, the largest 
ever purchase of an American defense firm by a foreign company. It recently sold its 
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share in Airbus (owned by EADS) at a significant loss in order to free up money for 
further U.S. acquisitions.142 However, as illustrated below, the fact it is a British 
company has offered significant advantages to BAE and demonstrates once again the 
degree to which governments attempt to keep control of their defense industries. 
Much as the European Union through the EDA attempts to keep business from 
leaving the continent, the U.S. government attempts to optimize any defense 
collaboration for the benefit of American industry as well, primarily (though not solely) 
through flexible legislation associated with the Buy America Act of 1933 and controls on 
exportation of technology. Recent legislation in Congress has attempted to block 
companies which receive government subsidies from competing in U.S. markets, a 
strategy clearly aimed to keep EADS and their Airbus aircraft from competing against 
Boeing for the enormous contract to replace U.S. Air Force tanker aircraft in the coming 
years. The Bush administration has threatened to veto such legislation, however, on the 
grounds that it limits flexibility in applying acquisition laws and may prompt retaliation 
against U.S. industry.143 The U.S. government prefers to use the State Department 
selectively to apply export control laws for different technologies thereby controlling 
which allies are used in defense collaboration.144 Transfer of technology continues to be 
the most contentious issue facing the U.S. in transatlantic defense cooperation and is 
widely considered to be the largest American-imposed roadblock to true transatlantic 
cooperation. As then Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson remarked in a speech 
advocating further cooperation in June 2002: 
No one is advocating an ‘anything goes’ liberalisation of the U.S. Export 
Control Act. But there is legitimate concern that the rules are sometimes - 
perhaps unintentionally - applied to distort economic competitive 
advantages rather than protecting legitimate security concerns.145 
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The Defense Trade and Security Initiative (DTSI) of 2000 was intended to 
“streamline processing of arms export license applications and increase mutual security 
with our allies.” Following the 9/11 attacks the State Department created the Directorate 
of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in January of 2003, which works in conjunction with 
NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative to ensure the DTSI is implemented fairly and 
effectively.146 Both initiatives attempt to check power from the executive branch which 
can over-politicize technology sharing and procurement decisions. But despite recent 
reforms, criticism continues against the U.S. export regime and its exclusion of European 
firms.147 
Recent procurement decisions, however, illustrate a welcome and constructive 
trend toward further collaboration on both sides of the Atlantic, which benefits not only 
defense industries but taxpayers as well. AugustaWest, a subsidiary of the Italian 
aerospace giant Finmeccanica, recently won the contract to produce the next presidential 
helicopter. Also, the Eurocopter UH-145 is set to become the U.S. Army’s next light 
utility helicopter, with orders placed for 42 aircraft so far (which presumably will not 
carry the “Eurocopter” moniker).148 The future cargo aircraft for the U.S. military, the 
Joint Cargo Aircraft, will either be the C27J Spartan (made by Alenia NorthAmerica, a 
division of Finmeccanica) or the EADS Casa C-295, both non-American firms which will 
include American partners. Most telling is the battle shaping up to replace the U.S. Air 
Force tanker fleet, where Boeing has recently seen its monopoly on this type of aircraft 
evaporate. EADS, buoyed by a recent $23 billion sale of Airbus tankers to the United 
Kingdom, teamed with the U.S. firm Northrop to bid on the USAF deal.149 A European 
aircraft comprising such a substantial part of the USAF fleet would be unprecedented to 
say the least and perhaps signal the arrival of an era where all military equipment will be 
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“internationalized” and thus in an utopian sense avail the security and defense of all 
NATO nations with the least expensive and greatest public good for all concerned.150 
In sum, transatlantic defense industrial bases have undergone significant changes 
following the Cold War, largely driven by industry itself and macro economic trends of 
globalization. The United States witnessed major integration beginning in the early 
1990’s and Europe was forced to follow beginning in 1998. Consolidation there took on 
political tones when the defense arm of the European Union gained steam, and issues of 
national sovereignty and Europeanism still govern policy in this realm. The United States 
government continues to wield influence primarily through its export control policy, but 
industrial collaboration persists between the two poles and seems to be the path of the 
future. Though a bipolar industrial base is currently giving way to multi-polarity in this 
arena, Europe still remains fragmented, with the larger industrial nations continuing to 
drive policy through the EU and the European Defense Agency. This consequently forces 
smaller countries to lean toward the U.S. in collaborative ventures. Thus, industrial issues 
and their manipulation by governmental bodies in Europe will have a large influence on 
defense procurement decisions there in the future.151 
 
C. MILITARY INFLUENCES 
The end of the Cold War did not halt the progression of capabilities in fighter 
aircraft. The disappearance of the Soviet threat resulted in an increase in regional 
conflicts and this consequently highlighted deficiencies in many air forces heretofore 
hidden. Operation Desert Storm of 1991 first demonstrated vast advancements in U.S. 
technology which left others behind. Several factors have been cited for this divergence 
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in capabilities which the 1990’s brought to the surface. One theory holds that the “peace 
dividend” caused Europe to slow its investment in future technologies while others say 
perhaps the fragmentation of European militaries and their supporting defense industrial 
bases had finally been brought to the forefront. It is surmised that the U.S. system when 
compared to Europe had been designed for efficiency in deploying and implementing 
force - as well as autonomously producing its arms - and the expeditionary nature of 
conflict in the 1990’s allowed the strengths of the U.S. structure to be realized.152 For 
whatever reason, the issue of diverging defense capacity between the U.S. and Europe, 
subsequently named the “capabilities gap,” congealed in the early 1990’s and continues 
today. Once again, this issue is nicely conveyed through factors relating to fighter 
aircraft. 
 
1. Operation Desert Storm 
Operation Desert Storm, though not a NATO operation, nonetheless served as the 
first opportunity for many NATO air forces to operate together in actual combat, though 
quite differently than imagined during their previous 40 years in the Alliance. For the 
first time, key deficiencies were identified that seriously hampered combat operations, 
with the two most glaring being secure communications between aircraft and control 
platforms and the inability to identify forces as friendly or foe (IFF).153 U.S. forces 
revealed impressive advancements in these areas that were rendered somewhat moot due 
to the necessary cooperation with their less capable allies. American forces also 
demonstrated great leaps ahead in such areas as precision guided munitions (PGMs), 
electronic countermeasures (ECM), and night vision capabilities. These innovations were 
largely the result of significant investment in R and D in the previous decades.154 In 
addition, satellite imagery used for targeting, long range precision cruise missiles and 
stealth technology acted as enormous force multipliers that consequently placed the U.S. 
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in the position of operational and tactical leader in air operations.155 The capabilities gap 
had officially been identified (though it was present before), but for several reasons its 
significance was temporarily minimized. Firstly, NATO itself was not involved and thus 
avoided criticism. Also, Desert Storm was a regional conflict with little implication for 
Europe, and therefore America’s dominance was not viewed as a threat to European 
sovereignty. As the decade wore on and other combat air operations were undertaken, 
however, this would cease to be the case. 
 
2. Conflict in the Balkans 
During the 1990’s European air forces participated in smaller NATO air 
operations in the Balkans such as Operation DENY FLIGHT and Operation 
DELIBERATE FORCE. Leaders recognized the implications of the capabilities gap in 
these campaigns and began taking steps to implement solutions. But the small size and 
limited scope of the missions during these operations minimized the sense of urgency for 
required improvements. It wasn’t until Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) in Kosovo 
from 24 March to 11 June 1999 that the seriousness of the capabilities gap was truly 
realized. Perhaps the most analyzed conflict of recent times, OAF gave rise to much 
debate and lessons learned stemming directly from the shocking divergence in capacity 
between the U.S. and its allies.156 These were felt at the political, strategic, and 
operational levels. Fissures in the coalition and operational incompatibility gave rise to 
European fears of further U.S. dominance in their own regional operations or worse of 
being excluded entirely from future conflicts. But it was the consequences of specific 
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capabilities at the tactical level that reverberated at the operational and strategic levels.157 
These tactical issues were exemplified in the fighter aircraft flying the sorties. 
The United States possessed many capacities that distanced its fighters from those 
of its allies, primarily due to the “Revolution in Military Affairs” which focused on 
expeditionary warfare and precision strike while profiting from recent technological 
advances and a move toward “network centric warfare.”158 Like in Desert Storm, secure 
communications and IFF were once again issues, where certain allies completely lacked 
capability and others remained incompatible due to “stovepiped” systems developed with 
little forethought toward collaboration.159 The inability to “go secure” necessitated 
passing target information “in the clear” at times, which led to target compromise and 
afforded the Serbs time to conceal or move themselves and their equipment.160 The U.S. 
also possessed the lion’s share of capacity in PGMs, night vision equipment, and ECM, 
similar to previous conflicts.161 European air forces were criticized for a lack of multi-
role capability, which caused unnecessary limitations in target planning operations.162 
Serbian concealment tactics stressed the significance of efficient C4ISR to find and 
quickly engage mobile targets, but once again U.S. forces were the few capable of using 
this critical technology and were often unable to share vital information with their 
coalition partners.163 The planning cycle was so encumbered and complicated due to 
                                                 
157 See John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for 
Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), 25. For example, a lack of M capacity 
in non-American assets forced the U.S. to fly the majority of the more demanding sorties and consequently 
take charge in dictating operational and procedures such as targeting plans. See Jack L. Sine II, 
“Organizing the Fight: Technological Determinants of Coalition Command and Control and Combat 
Operations” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), pages 46-50 for a detailed description of 
the consequences of the capabilities gap in OAF. See also: Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for 
Kosovo: Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), 
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2000), and Paul Gallis, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report #RL30374, 14 November 1999). 
158 Adams et al., Bridging the Gap, 2. See also Department of Defense, Office of Defense 
Transformation Military Transformation: A Strategic Report (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 
Office of Defense Transformation, 2003). 
159 Peters et al., 57. 
160 Larson et al., The Interoperability of NATO Allied Air Forces, 44. 
161 Paul Gallis, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Report #RL30374, 14 November 1999), 15. 
162 Peters et al., 102. 
163 Gallis, 24-26. 
63 
differing levels of capability and interoperability that time-sensitive targets (those fleeting 
enough to require quick approval to engage) were rendered almost untouchable.164 Also, 
American exclusivity in stealth technology and the understandable reluctance to share its 
secrets led to separate planning mechanisms for the “haves” and “have-nots,” yet another 
operational limitation stemming from the capabilities gap.165  
European governments were concerned not only with their relative inability to 
contribute to the battle, but especially with the grander repercussions. The indignity of 
the U.S. flying 70-80 percent of OAF’s missions in what amounted to a local conflict 
necessitated change in many European minds.166 As mentioned above, concerns of U.S. 
domination in the region were mixed with fears that America would act unilaterally in the 
future in order to avoid the encumbrances of inept coalition partners.167 The capabilities 
gap was untenable and needed urgent redressing. NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson summed up the European perspective best in 2002: 
The second reality is the increasing gap in defence capabilities between 
the US and its Allies. This gap was highlighted in Kosovo… Because the 
US has a range of military options that remain unavailable to its Allies, 
America's armed forces are obliged to carry the lion's share of some key 
combat missions and, hence, of the risks. If this gap is not addressed, we 
will face a political, conceptual and military divergence, which will make 
the transatlantic Alliance ever harder to sustain, on the battlefield and in 
the conference chamber.168 
 
3. Post-Kosovo Improvements 
Urgency was felt on both sides of the Atlantic to close the gap, at least on the 
surface, and U.S. prompting was greeted with swift action on the European side. NATO 
launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in late 1999 to “ensure that all allies 
remain not only interoperable, but that they also improve their capabilities to face the 
                                                 
164 Peters et al., 57. 
165 Sine, 42. 
166 Flournoy et al., European Defense Integration, 42. 
167 Stephen J. Coonen, “The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and 
Europe: Does it Matter?” U.S. Army War College Quarterly 36 (Autumn 2006): 67. 
168 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at GKN Farnborough Dinner, RAC Club, 
London, 25 July 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020725a.htm (accessed October 2006). 
64 
new security challenges.”169 The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) of 2002 
defined specific areas in which NATO required improvements from its member states. 
Additionally, NATO formed Allied Command Transformation in June of 2003 to 
streamline its organization and increase efficiency to be able to “face the operational 
challenges of coalition warfare against the threats of the new millennium.”170 The 
European Security and Defense Policy soon led to an additional impetus to increase 
capabilities, primarily through the ECAP. NATO and the EU worked together through 
the Berlin Plus agreements and the NATO-EU Capability Group to identify shortfalls and 
ensure cooperation in meeting them.171 Europe possessed not only the momentum but the 
birth of supporting organizations and bureaucracy to begin closing the capabilities gap. 
Organizational pressure from above joined with military pride from below to 
induce air forces into taking the necessary steps to increase capabilities. Programs which 
existed before OAF were accelerated and implemented (such as the MLU program in the 
EPAF F-16 countries) to solve many of the previously identified problems. Precision 
weapons were purchased from the U.S. in the short term, and France in concert with 
several European allies commenced their own PGM programs for the long term. Air 
forces quickly commenced equipping and training themselves to operate at night and in 
adverse weather, with multi-role capacity.172 While an overnight transformation to U.S.-
level capabilities was not possible, Europe nonetheless made considerable efforts and saw 
significant improvements in its fighter capabilities in the five years following the conflict 
in Kosovo. NATO’s identified areas of concern today reflect the decreased emphasis on 
the “fighter” capabilities, mostly due to increased emphasis in more urgent categories.173 
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Strategic airlift, active layered theater ballistic missile defense, and ground surveillance 
occupy a larger share of NATO’s capabilities initiatives in late 2006. However, the focus 
area involving fighter aircraft that continues to command attention today is C4ISR.174 
 
4. Interoperability Gains Steam 
With an increasing emphasis placed on C4ISR and interoperability between all 
elements of the battlefield, NATO attempted alliance-wide standardization programs 
which fell under the STANAGs, or standardization agreements. The Multifunction 
Information Distribution System (MIDS) is an example of NATO’s attempt to place all 
aircraft on a common data-link, which has shown success in recent years despite a lack of 
alliance-wide implementation.175 MIDS is based on the U.S. Link-16 system but was 
developed to allow users access to a common “grid” of information providing their 
national equipment remained compliant. On the U.S. side this was driven by operational 
requirements for more effective coalition operations, while European nations desired 
access to U.S. technology yet preferred indigenous production versus buying it off the 
American shelf.176 MIDS is recognized as a success so far within the Alliance, especially 
in communications between aircraft. Operations in Afghanistan have (re)emphasized the 
importance of aircraft communicating securely with ground troops, and improvements 
are consequently underway to strengthen this capability as well.177 MIDS illustrates the 
transatlantic compromises common in defense collaboration today, with European 
programs vying to remain autonomous yet compatible with crucial U.S. technology.  
A recent comprehensive study on transatlantic interoperability in C4ISR found 
that most countries care more about operating in conjunction with U.S. equipment than 
on a common European grid, yet few if any define interoperability as utilizing common 
equipment with their more powerful ally. The study advocated a “plug and play” 
approach on the European side, recommending they build certain parts of the network 
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themselves that will remain compatible with and easily connected to the U.S. system. 
This would allow them to utilize surveillance and reconnaissance products such as target 
data and satellite feeds offered by the more advanced American system.178 However, the 
limits of this type of interoperability remain a crucial issue for further collaboration, 
especially when considering the technology present in fighter aircraft. The following 
points illustrate “plug and play” to be an over-simplified approach.  
Interoperability is not as simple as common access to data but rather should be 
viewed holistically in terms of common strategies, operational cultures, and battlefield 
tactics.179 Merely plugging into “the grid” does not guarantee coalition partners the 
ability to fight efficiently upon arrival in the modern theatre of war.180 Additionally, a 
key assumption in the plug and play approach involves U.S. ability and willingness to 
share data acquired through its superior ISR technology. Sensitive technology ensures the 
U.S. of political and operational influence over its allies, as previously discussed, and is 
not easily relinquished due to existing export control laws or the desire to keep the 
current balance of power. Even if the U.S. desired to share its most sophisticated ISR data 
it will likely require years of development before availability to operators of non-U.S. 
equipment is feasible. Current operations in Afghanistan vindicate this view, as a good 
deal of U.S. data remains inaccessible to NATO allies.181 Lastly, interoperability 
demands a certain amount of infrastructure support for common equipment that is 
unavailable to airframes of different origins. For example, all NATO F-16 operators 
utilize the FalconView mission planning software which greatly simplifies multinational 
missions and enables missions simply not possible with differing airframes.182 These 
                                                 
178 Adams et al., Bridging the Gap, 144-150. 
179 NOTE: Ethan B. Kapstein categorizes interoperability as either complementarity (country X does 
one job, country Y another), commonality (X and Y operate identical platforms) , interchangeability (X can 
substitute their equipment for Y’s), or compatibility (X and Y’s equipment can operate together with 
degradation in capability). See Ethan B. Kapstein, “Capturing Fortress Europe: International Collaboration 
and the Joint Strike Fighter,” Survival 46 (Autumn 2004): 144. 
180 David R. Scruggs and Guy Ben-Ari interview. 
181 Major Jack Sine, former Chief, Air Superiority Weapons Requirements, Weapons Division, 
Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, 
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, personal interview by the author, Monterey, CA, 14 November 2006. 
182 Author’s personal experience as an F-16 pilot in NATO operations. 
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arguments suggest a distinct advantage to operating U.S. equipment which must not be 
discounted by decision-makers making interoperability-based procurement choices. 
 
5. American Interoperability with European Equipment? 
The question of whether to buy an American aircraft in order to remain fully 
interoperable is linked with current wisdom regarding rectification of the capabilities 
problem. Most analysts agree on the need for increased defense spending from European 
governments but in a more cohesive and rational manner, with emphasis on research and 
development. Some have suggested the “niche” approach, where respective national 
defense industries concentrate on those areas in which they excel yet continue to integrate 
on both a trans-European and transatlantic plane.183 This implies the ability to purchase 
European hardware yet remain fully capable and interoperable with U.S. equipment. 
Most experts agree that standardization and interoperability will strengthen European 
military capabilities and that NATO is the logical avenue for this undertaking. NATO has 
continually advocated further cooperation between U.S. and European defense industrial 
bases and a loosening of U.S. export controls on sensitive technologies, with a recent 
emphasis on collaboration in C4ISR.184 This is not to imply that American technology 
can only be accessed through purchase of its equipment, and certainly leaves the door 
open for European projects which may include more U.S. technology. Few would 
disagree that further defense cooperation and some sharing of U.S. technology combined 
with increased spending on the European side would help minimize the capabilities gap. 
However, as addressed above, the U.S. not only demands operational capability from its 
coalition partners, but hopes to achieve this through the sale of American equipment 
while keeping some degree of political and operational influence by closely guarding its 
superior technology. Therefore, additional U.S. technology will likely find its way to 
Europe only in a U.S.-led program. Thus, the question of required capabilities in 
Europe’s prospective fighters, when taken in the context of “full” interoperability with  
 
                                                 
183 Flournoy et al., European Defense Integration, 57. 
184 See Lord Robertson speech, 25 July 2002; also James Appathurai, “Closing the Capabilities Gap,” 
NATO Review, Autumn 2002, and The NATO Handbook, 175-176. 
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available battlefield assets (i.e. American ones), already points decision-makers across 
the Atlantic. And that neglects the largest differentiating capability between the two 
sides: stealth technology. 
 
6. Stealth As the Delineator 
Stealth technology seeks to prevent an aircraft’s detection by the enemy through 
reduced infrared, visual, and acoustic signatures. The most important tool in lessening the 
chances of detection is the reduction of an aircraft’s radar cross section (RCS). This can 
prevent detection by an enemy fighter’s radar and allow the first shot in a modern air 
battle but perhaps more importantly offers virtual invisibility to increasingly sophisticated 
air defense systems and surface to air missiles (SAMs). The U.S. began producing low 
observable (LO) aircraft in the 1960’s, with a great deal of R and D undertaken in the 
1970’s to apply the technology to tactical fighters and bombers. Today America holds a 
virtual monopoly on this technology and currently produces the only VLO (very low 
observable) supersonic fighter operational in the world with the F-22 Raptor.  
Not only have European aircraft manufacturers been left out of the stealth 
revolution, but much of it has been concentrated in one American company. Lockheed 
Martin produced stealth aircraft such as the SR-71 reconnaissance plane of the 1960’s, 
the F-117 Nighthawk in the 1980’s, and the F-22 today.185 Its stronghold on stealth R and 
D and technology continues in Lockheed’s F-35 Lightning II, also classified as a VLO 
fighter.186 Stealth is the most important reason the F-35 (JSF) is classified as a 5th-
generation aircraft, unlike its competitors currently on the market. And as virtually the 
only firm to have produced true stealth fighters since the 1970’s it is safe to say that 
Lockheed will ensure American dominance in this all-important field for some time to 
come. This could well serve as the deciding factor between European fighter options and 
their stealthy American counterpart. 
                                                 
185 Mark A. Lorell, and Hugh P. Leveau, The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of Fighter RandD (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 1998), 129-149. 
186 NOTE: The Joint Strike Fighter, or JSF, was renamed the F-35 Lightning II in July of 2006. From 
this point forward, the terms “Joint Strike Fighter,” “JSF,” and “F-35” will be used synonymously for the 
same aircraft. 
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In sum, fighter aircraft continued to evolve in the post-Cold War period with the 
U.S. Revolution in Military Affairs continuously introducing capabilities that Europe 
found difficult to match. The wake-up call in Kosovo was met with increased capacities 
in night vision equipment, PGMs, and all-weather aircraft and weapons. Some pressure to 
improve came from NATO, some from the European Union, and the U.S. itself offered 
impetus both explicitly and through unspoken threats of “going it alone” in future 
conflicts. But no sooner did Europe feel it had caught up than the interoperability of 
equipment took on increased importance, with air forces scrambling to ensure a place on 
the U.S.-owned secure network. This gave rise to debates as to the true definition of 
interoperability, with American technology advancing so quickly and unilaterally that 
perhaps the only way to be ensured a continued place in the war planning room was by 
joining the “U.S. Club” and subscribing to American equipment and tactics. Those who 
profess that equal capabilities with the U.S. can be achieved through European equipment 
that plugs into the American grid are unable to rationalize the absence of stealth 
capability in current European fighter designs. It seems that despite their best efforts, 
Europeans are continuously outdone by the enormous American R and D budgets. A 
capabilities-centric study of fighter aircraft currently available illustrates such a chasm.  
 
7. Available Fighter Aircraft and Corresponding Capabilities 
Numerous European governments are hoping to replace at least part of their 
current fighter fleets within the next 10 years. Though certainly not the only category 
affecting their decisions, aircraft capabilities will play a large role in the choices, 
particularly given the recent advances in network centric warfare and U.S. battlefield 
technology. Solely from a capabilities perspective, fighter aircraft procurement is an 
intricate process with many variables entering the picture, perhaps the most important 
being the ability to defeat anticipated threats. Other factors such as range, speed, 
maneuverability, and weapons capacity play a role depending on the anticipated mission 
such as air defense or ground attack. Also, less easily measurable criteria enter the 
equation, such as electronic attack and defensive capabilities, radar capabilities, sensor 
integration, and of course stealthiness. In the end, the aircraft with the capability to  
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survive while accomplishing the mission at the lowest price would win the competition in 
the absence of other factors. The fighter designs currently available for purchase by 
European governments demonstrate distinct differences in capabilities. 
The fighter jet market today is strikingly similar to 1975, with European 
governments deciding between a French, Swedish, European, and American plane. The 
French-made Dassault Rafale followed a similar design timeline as the Eurofighter, a 
joint project between the UK, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Both were designed in the mid-
1980’s and are only now entering operational service in their respective air forces. The 
Swedish-made Gripen, like the Rafale and Eurofighter, is a 4th-generation fighter which 
has seen service in different versions since 1997. The F-35 Lightning II (aka the Joint 
Strike Fighter) is the only 5th-generation fighter on the market, meaning it “incorporates 
all the technology and stealth of previous generations plus network-centric warfare 
capability.” Unlike 4th generation fighters, which employ ad-hoc solutions to increase 
stealth and information presentation to the pilot, a 5th generation aircraft integrates all 
into a seamless product which can plug into the global information grid.187 
In terms of airframe performance, the Eurofighter and Rafale are quite similar. 
Both are highly maneuverable and venerable in a close-in fight, while sporting top speeds 
of Mach 2.0+. The Gripen does not sell its maneuverability compared to the other two, 
but also lists a top speed of Mach 2.0+. The F-35 will be slightly less maneuverable than 
the others and claims a top speed of Mach 1.6, but its range is hailed as superior to its 
competitors, especially compared with the Gripen.188 Jane’s reports a combat radius in 
the Gripen of 432 nm, significantly less than its competitors, but this will be increased if 
special versions of the aircraft are built for Denmark and Norway in 2010. If range and 
agility are the deciding factors for airframe performance, data shows the F-35 edging the 
Rafale on range and the Typhoon and Rafale taking the agility contest. 
                                                 
187 Col. Richard Harris, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Oslo, Norway, 
interactive forum, Dagbladet Online,  http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/05/01/464964.html (accessed 
August 2006). 
188 See Harold C. Hutchinson, “F-35 News: Why Australia went with the F-35,” F-16.net website, 
http://www.f-16.net/news_article1519.html (accessed March 2006), Gripen website, 
http://www.gripen.com/en/GripenFighter/TechnicalSummary.htm, (accessed November 2006), Jane’s All 
the World’s Aircraft, www.Janes.com (accessed November 2006), and Col. Richard Harris interactive 
forum. 
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Weapons carrying capacity remains fairly constant across the three 4th generation 
fighters. The Typhoon was originally designed as an air superiority fighter but future 
upgrades to “Tranche 2” will render the aircraft capable of carrying the latest in air-to-air 
and air-to-ground precision weapons. The Rafale was optimized for air-to-ground 
delivery from its inception with quite capable air superiority abilities as well, and the 
Gripen will almost match the air-to-ground capability of its European counterparts. The 
only significant difference between the four aircraft in this regard is a diminished 
quantity of weapons carriage in the F-35, but this is owed to its internal weapons design 
which is a significant contributor to its stealth qualities. However, the option to carry 
weapons and fuel tanks externally exists if LO capability is not essential for a mission.189 
Regardless, the F-35 will carry significantly less air-to-air ordnance than the others, due 
to its design as a strike platform. 
The Rafale, Gripen, and Typhoon are fairly well-balanced in terms of electronic 
capabilities. All sport similar avionics suites with capable Pulse Doppler radars that will 
be upgraded to active electronically scanned arrays (AESA, much more capable radars) 
in the coming five years. The Eurofighter and Rafale tout MIDS data-links (fully NATO-
compliant and compatible with U.S. Link-16) while the Gripen possesses “the world’s 
most highly developed data link,” but does not claim MIDS compliance. All three aircraft 
either possess or will soon hype advanced targeting pods with electro-optical and infrared 
capabilities, but advanced defensive suites containing missile and laser warnings and 
advanced electronic warfare (EW) abilities are either currently unfunded or still five 
years away from operational status. The Eurofighter seems to be the better funded aircraft 
for such advanced electronic capacities.190 What is significant about the three aircraft’s 
advanced technological capabilities is their ad hoc nature and lack of integration from the 
design phase. This also requires many of the “add-ons” to be found on the exterior of the 
aircraft, such as advanced targeting pods, which increases drag and observability to  
 
 
                                                 
189 See Joint Strike Fighter Website, http://www.jsf.mil/f35/f35_technology.htm, (accessed November 
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190 Jane’s Website, http://www.Jane’s.com (accessed November 2006), and Gripen Website, 
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enemy radars. While they will certainly be impressive aircraft when operational to their 
full capacity (assuming they will be funded to that level), the lack of total sensor 
integration is largely what will keep them classified as 4th generation fighters. 
The F-35, if somewhat equal or even inferior in airframe performance and 
weapons capacity, is set to far outshine its 4th generation competitors in the technological 
capabilities realm. While still in the System Design and Development (SDD) phase, the 
merits of having an additional 7-10 years over its competitors to incorporate critical 
technological advances are already apparent. The fact that all systems are designed and 
integrated concurrently from the program inception will constitute perhaps the largest 
advantage over its competition. For example, the EW system will function as a defensive 
radar warning receiver, countermeasure dispenser, and electronic surveillance measures 
(ESM) system, which prevents the need to add features to the system at a later date. In 
lieu of adding a targeting pod to the aircraft after its initial design phase, the F-35 will 
sport a fully integrated and internal electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) capable of 
both advanced targeting and reconnaissance features.191 The AN/APG 81 active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar was integrated at the origin of the program, 
profiting from U.S. technological dominance in this area and offering not only all-
weather target detection but also identification. Missile and laser warnings will also come 
as standard equipment on the aircraft.192 According to the F-35 website, it will “have the 
most robust communications suite of any fighter aircraft built to date. The F-35 will be 
the first fighter to possess a satellite communications capability that integrates beyond 
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The advanced “sensor fusion” compared to its competitors will exclusively allow 
the F-35 to serve as not only a strike aircraft, but an ISR platform as well. The 
importance of this capability on today’s network centric battlefield cannot be understated. 
As Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne recently stated:  
The F-35 Lightning II will bring added sensor-fused targeting, situational 
awareness, and persistence to the Joint and Coalition Team, with all-
weather, precision air-to-surface employment across the spectrum of 
missions. This team delivers us access and brings an added dimension that 
the F-15/F-16 mix could not - these new fighters will be our front-line ISR 
platforms. With access to airspace that traditional ISR platforms do not 
have due to the threat environment, they will “Hoover up” all kinds of 
data, bringing our warfighters Spherical Situational Awareness.194 
Earlier this year, funding was canceled for the E-10A program, a platform slated 
to integrate and improve upon the C2 and ISR missions of the AWACS and JSTARS 
with a single aircraft. A recent article in Aerospace Daily described the F-35 as “touted 
by some program officials as ‘our own little EA-6B, JSTARS and AWACS.’ That means 
it is capable of jamming signals and communications, providing command and control 
and conducting long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground surveillance.”195 The U.S. 
Marine’s Deputy Commandant for Aviation described the platform as being able to “jam 
enemy radars, perform surveillance, stream data and battlefield videos to troops on the 
ground, and serve as a link to spy drones and satellites.”196 While a good deal of the F-
35’s capabilities are understandably classified, the fact remains that none of its European 
competitors will come close to its ability to gather information and disseminate it to not 
only its pilot but virtually all other assets on the battlefield. 
The precarious issue of determining aircraft cost of course enters the process 
when evaluating relative capabilities of potential choices. Falling under the “it depends 
who you ask” category, there are wildly differing views on the actual price of these four 
ultra-competitive programs. The Gripen marketers claim it to be the cheapest, at $40 
                                                 
194 Speech by Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 
19 October 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=281 (accessed November 2006). 
195 “JSF cuts possible as 2008 budget drafted,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 31 October 
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million per plane, while the Eurofighter and Rafale are repeatedly singled out as 
overpriced and under capable by those selling the F-35. But as the F-35 is much earlier in 
its design process and the only aircraft not in operation in any air force at the time of 
writing, its price continues to increase and not surprisingly takes on less importance as a 
selling point as the program continues to develop. Lockheed Martin has stated the cost 
for purchasing their product will not be determined until three years before the actual 
procurement, a milestone still some years away. Reasons for varying prices on the four 
competitors comprise the inclusion of R and D costs, estimated maintenance and 
weapons costs over the lifetime of an aircraft, the addition of Value Added Tax (VAT) on 
European jets, and offset prices due to industrial participation offered to purchasing 
countries.  
A recent study conducted by Defense-aerospace attempted to arrive at objective 
figures for per-aircraft cost of all Western fighters currently on the market. It made 
extensive use of various government reports while avoiding numbers published by 
aircraft manufacturers (though the companies were allowed to rebut the conclusions at 
the end of the study). Table 2 shows the best summary currently available for comparing 
the four aircraft, shown as unit procurement costs (per aircraft price not including R and 
D), program unit costs (which include R and D) and price per kilogram (the closest 
measurable number to capability vs. cost). While tough to draw conclusions due to the 
aforementioned limitations of such numbers, it is certainly arguable that the F-35 will 
qualify as the best aircraft for the money. It is important to note as well that a greater 
industrial participation package will offset the costs of a program and likely exceed it 













Weighted Cost 7 Cost per 
Kilogram 8 
Eurofighter 1 $118.6M $143.8M $112.5M $14,748 
Rafale C 2 $62.1M $135.8M $55.7M $14,446 
Gripen 3 $68.9M $76.07M $84.0M $13,345 
F-35 Lightning II 4 $115.0M $112.5M $115.0M $9,375 
Source: “Sticker Shock: Estimating the Real Cost of Modern Fighter Aircraft.” 
An occasional report by defense-aerospace.com 
 
Note 1: Prices shown are for the UK version, the Eurofighter Typhoon. 
Note 2: The Rafale C is the single-seat conventional takeoff and landing used by the French Air Force. 
Note 3: Prices shown are for the C Model Gripen offered to Poland in a 2002 bid. This was the only aircraft 
with published export figures, but includes some offset entitlements. 
Note 4: Prices shown are the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) estimate. 
Note 5: Obtained by dividing the latest production contract by number of aircraft ordered, thus excluding 
most R and D costs. 
Note 6: Includes R and D costs and most ancillary costs such as support equipment and spare parts. This is 
generally accepted as the most accurate gauge of per-aircraft cost. 
Note 7: Converted into Purchasing Power Parity to dispel differences in costs of labor and materials in 
different countries. See The Economist, http://www.economist.com/markets/bigmac. (Accessed November 
2006). 
Note 8: Fighters are generally considered to “cost what they weigh,” making this figure a rough estimate of 
cost versus capabilities. 
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To this point several conclusions can be reached. Firstly, even if the EU (through 
the European Defense Agency) succeeds in its push for a common defense market which 
largely excludes the U.S., it will be years before such a venture is achieved. More 
importantly, this kind of initiative is dominated by the larger nations with powerful 
defense industries and will drive the smaller nations toward further collaboration with 
America. Second, the EDA plan (if true) is flawed, as transatlantic collaboration is 
essential to the survival of defense industrial bases on both sides of the Atlantic. This is 
perhaps more imperative for industries in smaller European countries that are unable to 
compete in the crowded European market and see greater opportunities with the 
American defense industrial behemoth. Third, the smaller EPAF nations who purchased 
and flew the F-16 together experienced overwhelmingly positive results from a 
capabilities, interoperability (in both equipment and tactics), and industrial perspective. 
The service life of their aircraft will be met in roughly the next 8-15 years, necessitating a 
replacement decision. Fourth, these nations will most likely replace their aging fighters 
with newer ones (though debates are still ongoing in several countries) and the field has 
effectively been narrowed to three choices.197 Fifth, the F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike 
Fighter) promises to be the most capable of the three, especially in the critical categories 
of sensor fusion and stealth technology. It arguably holds the best “bang for the buck” as 
well, though its final cost is yet to be determined. Finally, based on its superior capacities 
in ISR and undetected precision strike, maximum allied operation in the F-35 has the 
potential to both reduce the current capabilities gap and encourage multilateralism in 
future aerial coalition warfare. From these preliminary conclusions the question arises for 
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Table 3.   Summary of Factors Influencing Government Fighter Procurement Decisions 
 
Political Issues Industrial factors Military Influence 
• Relations with U.S. 
• Pressure to buy 
European products  
• European or Atlantic 
view on relations 
• Public importance 
placed on military 
• Domestic budgetary 
constraints and priorities 
• Ability to produce 
indigenously 
• Access to U.S. 
technology 
• Previous experience (i.e. 
F-16 program) 
• Civilian vs. military 
emphasis in aerospace 
sector 
• Niche capabilities 
• Capabilities required to 
meet threat 
• Importance placed on 
interoperability with 
U.S. 
• Experience with 
previous fighters (i.e. in 
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IV.  JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS THE PARADIGM 
Many advantages in the realms of bi-lateral diplomacy, industrial policy, alliance 
cohesion and operational effectiveness adhere to a multi-national participation in the JSF 
program. This section suggests the exemplary political, strategic and operational benefits 
of the program and offers this case study to determine the procurement rationale of four 
key NATO members. The aircraft is unmatched as a fighter in the areas of sensor fusion 
and stealth; moreover, it acts as the key node to the information grid and the “gatekeeper 
of interoperability” on the network centric battlefield of the present. Acquisition of the 
aircraft ostensibly offers allies diplomatic advantages in the form of favor from the U.S. 
administration and Congress; while from the stand point of industrial policy, the new 
plane offers advantages of participation in manufacturing and possible technology 
transfers of great merit to indigenous contractors. Nonetheless, in contrast to the past 
certain European F-16 countries have refrained from participation in the program, and 
those that are involved may elect not to continue for various reasons analyzed below. A 
look at the program itself and at wider issues for partner countries will offer insight into 
their reluctance. Further, the present examination speculates on the significance of the 
Joint Strike Fighter for Alliance cohesion and Alliance maintenance. This section will 
focus on the EPAF countries of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, with 
supporting evidence offered from narratives of other nations as well.  
 
A. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM 
The JSF program began in 1996 (then known as the Joint Advanced Strike 
Technology Program) in the U.S. Department of Defense as a response to anticipated 
threat scenarios and enemy capabilities. A main goal of the program from the U.S. 
perspective has been to find further ways to reduce costs, given the shrinking defense 
budgets and increasing price of high technology components. The aircraft offers 
“affordable next generation strike aircraft weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force, 
Marines, and our allies. The focus of the program is affordability - reducing the 
development cost, production cost, and cost of ownership of the JSF family of 
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aircraft.”198 In order to achieve this welcome set of goals, commonality among the 
services was essential, and the aircraft is now set to replace F-18 C/D’s of the Navy and 
Marines, AV/8B Harriers of the Marines, and F-16 and A-10 fighters from the Air Force. 
Current plans call for 2,458 aircraft in three different versions, but with 70-90% 
commonality of components and systems to reduce manufacturing costs.199  
Another crucial aspect designed to reduce costs of the program has been 
international partner participation. According to a recent GAO report: 
The program is expected to benefit the United States by reducing its share 
of program costs, giving it access to foreign industrial capabilities, and 
improving interoperability with allied militaries. Partner governments 
expect to benefit from defined influence over aircraft requirements, 
improved relationships with aerospace companies and access to JSF 
program data.200 
Eight countries joined the JSF System Design and Development (SDD) phase in 2002, at 
differing “tiers,” or levels, depending on the amount invested in the program. (See Figure 
2) This does not obligate a country to buy the aircraft at a later date, nor does it prevent 
other nations from buying “off the shelf” through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program in the future. At the time of writing in November 2006, the partner countries are 
considering signing the Production Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) 
Memorandum of Understanding, which essentially continues partnership in the program 
as it moves toward testing, evaluating, and producing the aircraft.201 It’s the next phase of 
the program, not committing to a buy, but very close to it. The JSF program, the largest 
collaborative defense venture in history (currently valued at $276 billion), is the first 
transatlantic co-development project undertaken for fighter aircraft, with the Pentagon 
                                                 
198 JSF International Program Website, http://www.jsf.mil/program/index.htm (accessed November 
2006). 
199 Christopher Bolkom, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program: Background, Status, and Issues 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Report #RL30563, 2 June 2006), 1-3. NOTE: 
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200 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals 
are Met, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-03-775, 21 July 2003), 1-2. 
201 See F-35 II Website, http://www.jsf.mil/index.htm (accessed December 2006) and Andy Nativi 
and Douglas Barrie, “Europeans Earmark Billions for JSF,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 220, 21 
November 2006, 4. 
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sensibly relying on foreign participation not only in financing but also design.202 In fact, 
primarily due to Marine interest in a Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) 
version for Harrier replacement, the UK entered as a full collaborative partner bringing 
valuable expertise in such areas and in reversal of what had been in earlier decades a 
predatory relationship to the detriment of the UK.  
 
Figure 2: JSF Partner Financial Contributions and Estimated Aircraft Purchases 
 
Figure 2.   JSF Partner Financial Contributions and Estimated Aircraft Purchases 
Source: Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program needs Greater Oversight 
to Ensure Goals are Met, (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-03-775, 
21 July 2003), 10. 
 
Members of particular interest for this study are the EPAF countries of Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Norway as participating Tier 2 and Tier 3 partners (who seek 
replacements for their F-16’s) and, in contrast, the absence of Belgium from the program 
as the remaining original EPAF member from the 1970’s. Advantages for these nations to 
investing in the SDD phase include a greater say in the design requirements of the 
aircraft, access to the first models off the production line, and the chance to recoup 
                                                 
202 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Capturing Fortress Europe: International Collaboration and the Joint Strike 
Fighter,” Survival 46 (Autumn 2004): 143. 
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investment (a percentage of the sales proceeds) on future JSF sales, a significant 
advantage over FMS customers. Perhaps the biggest benefit of entry at the SDD phase is 
the large amount of industrial work available to the national aerospace companies of 
partner countries.203 The JSF project would “provide foreign partners with a windfall 
opportunity to acquire American defense technology, while promoting aerospace-related 
jobs at home.”204 
The industrial participation aspect of the JSF program is unprecedented in large 
programs of this sort. In such co-production ventures as the F-104G and the F-16 MNFP, 
industrial “offsets” generally were assigned commensurate with a nation’s financial 
contributions to the program, but the JSF model is built on a “best value” approach.205 
Under this construct, Lockheed Martin acts as the lead contractor for the entire program 
but assigns subcontracting work based on a competitive sourcing process. Industrial 
partners both foreign and domestic must “qualify for participation through demonstration 
of world-class products and technologies representing cost advantages to the 
program.”206 The suppliers must meet certain benchmarks, while a failure to do so results 
in “opening themselves to re-competition.”207 Lockheed Martin acts independently of the 
U.S. government in assigning competitive subcontracts and does so without regard to 
country of origin, instead basing awards on such factors as the ability of a company’s 
management structure to meet JSF schedules, reducing production and design costs 
within acceptable risk levels, and searching for opportunities for technical 
improvements.208 A program of this nature represents a significant departure from 
standard offset arrangements that European nations are accustomed to with U.S. 
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programs; but such reforms appear to solve the problem of inefficiencies the U.S. often 
encountered in foreign production by instead rewarding winning companies with the 
opportunity to reap more benefits from a contract with efficient production.209 
From the perspective of U.S. policy and strategy, there are several key reasons to 
promote partner participation. The JSF program offers not only a capable aircraft that will 
decrease costs through its commonality among the services, but the international nature 
of the program all but ensures its survival from the ax of Congress.210 In addition, if 
likely coalition partners in future conflicts purchase the aircraft, holistic interoperability 
in terms of communications, data sharing, and common tactics is all but guaranteed, 
increasing the combat effectiveness of all parties. From an American grand strategy 
viewpoint, allies that operate a U.S.-designed aircraft infused with U.S. stealth 
technology will (despite being quite capable on the battlefield) remain somewhat 
deferential to the American operational mindset and tactics, thereby ensuring continued 
influence for the United States. Lastly, economic interests for U.S. industry remain 
enormous, as the JSF not only offers several prospective sales in Europe worth multiple 
billions of dollars, it also represents the continuing footprint of the American fighter 
industry on the European continent. Additionally, American industry prefers a model 
international program where all partners are satisfied and purchase maximum numbers of 
the aircraft in order to showcase the advantages to future FMS sales recipients. 
Thus, the Joint Strike Fighter international program from the U.S. perspective 
and, to be sure, that of this author as a witness of the benefits of multi-national use 
aircraft, represents a gainful and profitable approach for parties on both sides of the 
Atlantic. However, for what to them must be compelling reasons of politics, strategy, and 
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national specifics, certain continental European governments of the early-21st century (or 
factions therein) do not share the enthusiasm of the JSF program office. Their objections 
to the program - or outright abstention from it - start to shed light on transatlantic issues 
at hand. 
  
B. PARTNER NATION ISSUES 
The above analysis has treated a wide variety of such issues as grand strategy, the 
technical progress of the weapons in the air, industrial policy and past efforts to square 
the aerospace circle in the North Atlantic area. Included in this analysis were transatlantic 
political issues and domestic ones as yet unknown. Here pressures operate to maintain the 
capability for combat in air, on a national and perhaps from an EU standpoint. Industrial 
base concerns were examined, especially for smaller countries unable to indigenously 
produce their own aircraft, and must look to larger countries and across the ocean. Also, 
tendencies to continue collaborative programs such as the F-16 which also offered 
interoperability and combat commonality with the Alliance’s most influential partner 
have been addressed. Now those issues will be examined in the context of the JSF, 
specifically those countries whose F-16s are approaching the end of the service lives in 
the next decade.  
 
1. Political Issues 
The acquisition of combat aircraft represents a civil-military process of particular 
political virulence, given the public visibility of the programs, the long service lives 
(typically spanning 30-40 years), and the substantial portion they occupy in defense 
budgets, most of all in smaller nations. Examples from 2004-2006 illustrate the political 
issues which arise in such undertakings. Saudi Arabia signed a deal in August of 2006 to 
purchase 48 Eurofighters from the UK’s BAE systems, but at the time of writing have 
placed the deal on hold in retaliation for an ongoing UK bribery investigation stemming 
from earlier fighter contracts with Saudi Arabia. The investigation will soon reveal the 
names of high ranking Saudis for whom alleged slush funds were established in order to 
ensure the sale, with political implications large enough to threaten the suspension of 
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diplomatic relations between the two kingdoms.211 Russia has joined the competition 
with France, Sweden, the U.S., and the Eurofighter group for India’s next fighter 
purchase of 126 multi-role combat aircraft, and the Indian decision will have certain 
geopolitical and strategic implications.212 An inherent problem with analyzing the 
rationale behind political decisions lies in the inability to unearth the true factors which 
influenced such decisions, as well as the relative weight placed on these factors. This will 
be examined now with the information at hand. 
 
a. Transatlantic Level 
A nation’s relationship with the U.S. greatly affects the issue at hand, and 
the decision to purchase an American fighter or not. There certainly exists the possibility 
that the recent transatlantic “rift” over the Iraq War continues to bring lingering 
consequences in the defense procurement business. Those nations who object to U.S. 
action in Iraq, seem to be migrating toward non-American choices when offered the 
option to do so in defense purchases. Denmark and the Netherlands both profess strong 
relationships with the U.S. and both contributed military forces to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan which 
preceded NATO’s ISAF.213 The Netherlands was the first to sign the most recent MOU 
to continue in the JSF program, and Denmark appears to be a strong possibility for a 
purchase of the jet in the coming years.214 
Norway‘s relationship with the U.S. has been strained over the Iraq War, 
more so since a center-left government took power in October of 2005. Prime Minister 
Kjell Magne Bondevik informed President Bush in March of 2003 of Norway’s intention 
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to send only humanitarian troops to Iraq in the event of conflict due to disagreements 
over the legitimate use of force without UN mandates. The first motion of the new 
government in 2005 involved the withdrawal of those troops as well as forces supporting 
OEF in Afghanistan.215 The U.S./Norway relationship has shown strains through the JSF 
program at times as well, most notably in May of 2006 following Norwegian anger at 
U.S. Ambassador Benson K. Whitney’s remarks insinuating U.S. pressure to purchase the 
aircraft. The situation was somewhat resolved after some diplomatic exchanges, with 
Norway agreeing to remain in the program but a spokesman for the Defense Ministry 
tellingly remarking, “If we end up buying fighter jets other than the JSF, it doesn’t mean 
we’re turning our back on the U.S.”216 
Belgium joined Germany and France as vocal critics of the war in Iraq, 
refusing to take part in the planning for the possible defense of Turkey during Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM.217 On the 6th of March of 2003, Belgian Minister of Defense André 
Flahaut declared that in the event of an “illegal” U.S. invasion of Iraq, no American ships 
would transit Belgian ports, and no American aircraft would transit Belgian airspace.218 
Matters worsened after combat operations began as war-crimes lawsuits were filed 
against high-level Americans such as Secretary of State Colin Powell in Belgian courts 
under an obscure law allowing such litigation from foreign sources. The U.S. retaliated 
with threats to withhold NATO funding for a new headquarters, among other diplomatic 
tools, and Belgium quickly changed the law to mitigate the damage.219 Relations have  
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since warmed, but apprehension toward the U.S. seemingly remains in certain Belgian 
political circles.220 Thus, transatlantic political issues quite possibly play a large role in 
Belgium’s decision to forgo the JSF at this time. 
Another issue affecting Belgo-American relations in combat aviation 
cooperation involves recoupments from the F-16 program, specifically the MLU upgrade. 
As the upgrade was offered to different countries outside the EPAF four, those original 
members were set to recoup money for the sale, but this was inexplicably halted when the 
U.S. sold the MLU to Taiwan and changed the structure of the transaction to exempt any 
European recoupments. This of course caused some consternation within the Belgian 
government (and doubtless the other three as well) and may well have added to 
preexisting views on the divergence of U.S. and Belgian interests in the aforementioned 
categories. Though many factions, including the Belgian Air Force, considered it a 
political issue which did not affect the strong military cooperation with the U.S, Members 
of Parliament remained fully aware of the recoupment issue when deciding to join the 
SDD program.221 
Another transatlantic political issue affecting governmental procurement 
decisions toward the JSF is that of operational sovereignty, or being able to fly, repair, 
and maintain the aircraft without U.S. support. This is an important issue in the JSF given 
the unprecedented level of sensitive technology found in the aircraft, and the unparalleled 
level of multinational industrial collaboration involved in the design and production of 
the jet. In reality, the highly classified stealth technology and source codes required to 
repair sensitive electronics (and American unwillingness to share them) mean that a 
nation will be somewhat dependent on the U.S. if it purchases the fighter. The UK has 
publicly demanded more technology transfer to guard its independence in the matter 
(discussed later), but the loss of operational sovereignty takes a different slant when 
viewed from the smaller nations. Being operationally bound to the maker of your fighters 
is a much starker reality if there is only one combat aircraft in the inventory, as is the case 
for Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. While not a pressing issue for the 
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Netherlands given its high level of military to military support for U.S. equipment and 
tactics, operational sovereignty in Belgium is perhaps of larger consequence given its 
recent political distancing from America.222 Evidence indicates that such other factors as 
aircraft capability will outweigh any loss of independence in the event of JSF sales to 
Denmark and Norway.223 224 
NATO currently wields little influence over the four EPAF countries in 
the procurement of fighter aircraft. According to a participant in NATO capability 
dialogues since 2004, the NATO Air Force Armaments Groups, specifically Aerospace 
Capability Group 1 does discuss “aircraft issues,” but the issue of specific fighter 
capabilities is not on the table. And the subject of a common purchase of fighter aircraft 
is a subject never breached in this context.225 Pressure from the EU to purchase a non-
American aircraft had even less relevance to members’ decisions, according to 
representatives in the JSF international office. The European Defense Agency and its 
push for a European Defense Equipment Market has no bearing on governmental 
decisions to purchase the JSF, at least in the sense of pressure to buy European.226 
Speculation remains that it may even force smaller countries such as the EPAF members 
more toward U.S. equipment. 
Belgium finds itself in a unique position regarding these issues. 
Agreements with the Netherlands state it will operate the same equipment, yet the Dutch 
have more or less chosen the JSF as their next fighter without consultation with Belgium 
or other European partners. In a report presented to the Chamber of Representatives of 
the Belgian Parliament, the views of the Minister of Defense are expressed as disdainful 
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toward the Netherlands for putting them in the awkward position of being forced to 
choose the JSF in order to honor its commitments to its Benelux neighbor.227 The report 
blames European defense integration for exacerbating the difference between 
“Europeanist” nations such as Belgium and “Atlanticist” nations such as the 
Netherlands.228 Belgium public opinions are consistently more positive than most EU 
member states in its trust for EU institutions and its support for a common foreign and 
security policy as well.229 
 
b. Domestic Politics 
Domestic political issues are perhaps the most influential to this study, yet 
those least able to offer true insight due to the nature of “closed-door” meetings between 
politicians and interest groups. The normal variety of political, social and economic 
groups shape domestic politics in continental Europe as is the case in the U.S. or the UK. 
This process shall naturally play a formidable role in the decision of respective 
governments to acquire the JSF. Anti-war interest groups, anti-U.S. interests and budget 
issues as are visible elsewhere but shall undoubtedly make their voices heard in such a 
decision. Nonetheless, publicly known developments in potential JSF customer nations 
serve to illustrate the domestic issues exerting influence on this important national 
decision. The most influential factors are logically budget issues and views on the 
importance of defense to reigning politicians.  
Greece, by way of example, originally signed a contract with EADS to 
purchase 60 Eurofighters but budget constraints stemming from cost overruns at the 2004 
Olympic Games forced a cancellation of this order and a redirection toward the smaller 
and cheaper order of 30 F-16 Block 52’s. An additional fighter purchase was planned for 
2009-2010, which included the JSF as a possibility, but this has now been moved to the 
right due to another modification of defense budget priorities. However, Turkey’s likely 
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purchase of the JSF for delivery in 2015 as well as Greece’s cooperation with the U.S. in 
three separate orders of F-16’s will certainly have sway toward the JSF when money is 
found in the budget.230 
Denmark’s venture to replace its F-16’s has largely avoided political 
wrangling and threats of cancellation in the Parliament. Recently, however, the Social 
Democrats proposed replacing the country’s aging fighters with attack helicopters, a 
proposal described as “interesting” by the Minister of Defense, yet seemingly 
unrealistic.231 The decision to replace fighters has never been seriously questioned, 
though logically some debate has taken place in Parliament over the choice of 
replacements. 
Domestic politics will likely play a much larger role when Norway 
decides on the replacement for its F-16’s. National elections in September of 2005 
brought two political parties into power that denigrated the JSF while in opposition, and 
perhaps the two most important posts for defense procurement went to these parties. 
Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen, Norway’s Minister of Defense, belongs to the leftist Labour 
Party, which holds 32.7% of the seats in Parliament, while the Ministry of Finance is held 
by Kristin Halvorsen of the Socialist Left Party of Norway, currently holding 9% of the 
seats. The latter party is openly critical of large defense contracts and Norway’s 
participation in NATO or coalition operations with the United States, a fact that does not 
bode well for the future of the JSF in Norway.232 
Despite strong support from both military and industry, domestic politics 
nearly derailed the JSF program in the Netherlands in 2006. When the Dutch government 
resigned in June, an interim cabinet took over until a national election on the 22nd of 
November, with the agreement that no major decisions would be undertaken until the 
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next administration was in place. However, given the Labour Party’s promise that no 
JSF’s would be purchased if they took power, the interim Christian-Democrat and 
Conservative government took action to sign the MOU committing the Netherlands to the 
PSFD phase on 14 November 2006. This sensitive political action involved moving up 
the scheduled December signing of the MOU in the JSF Program Office to ensure 
continued Dutch support for the program, which once again appears to be on track.233 
This example illustrates the powerful influence of domestic politics on such decisions and 
clever workarounds by other interested parties. 
The impact of domestic politics on Belgium’s decision to refrain from the 
SDD phase of the JSF program is difficult to measure given the immense complexity of 
this matter. Two of Belgium’s three regions, Flanders and Wallonia, house separate 
governments with differing sets of political parties, and relations between the two regions 
are traditionally tense, which greatly complicates decisions at the national level.234 
However, it is safe to say that defense-related issues do not occupy a large portion of the 
public consciousness in this small nation, even more so than in others. Leftist parties 
currently hold 98 out of 150 seats in Parliament, with social programs generally 
commanding higher priorities than defense in their platforms.235 In addition, political 
personality takes on a large role in Belgium which seemingly has affected the JSF 
decision a great deal. The Ministry of Defense has been occupied by André Flahaut of the 
Parti Socialiste since 12 July 1999, whose Gaullist outlook presented itself during the 
U.S. Invasion of Iraq in 2003 (see page 82). Flahaut can be said to be no friend of combat 
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aviation in Belgium and the lack of a decision to date as to the replacement of F-16’s in 
2015 is likely linked to both the pro-Gaullist European and anti-fighter aircraft views of 
the Defense Minister.236 
 
2. Issues with JSF Industrial Participation 
The Joint Strike Fighter Industrial Participation Program, as previously discussed, 
is unprecedented in its scale and international character. Designed to ensure more 
involvement for business than competing aircraft programs in the hopes of securing 
aircraft orders, it targeted the “third pillar,” or national defense industries as customers in 
lieu of simply foreign militaries. The departure from traditional offset programs would 
also in a sense allow industries to determine their own profit from the program, as greater 
efficiency would lead to a better overall product at a cheaper price, thus leading to 
additional export orders outside of the original partners and corresponding recoupments 
for nations and their industry. Industrial participation clearly plays an enormous role in 
convincing governments to purchase fighters, as evidenced in recent campaigns by both 
Eurofighter and Saab teams to match potential JSF industrial shares. However, this aspect 
of the JSF program is not without criticism from partner nations and industries. A large 
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense examined this issue in depth in 2003, 
and the following section seeks to expand on its findings.237 Analyzing grievances of 
partner nations as well as industrial motivations of non-participating countries greatly 
aids in the search for JSF procurement decision rationale. 
 
a. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands’ participation in JSF appears equally hinged on military 
requirements and industrial involvement, and clearly a major pillar of the Dutch JSF 
“sales campaign” to decision-makers in Parliament involves the health of the national 
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aerospace industry. Following the collapse of long-time aerospace giant Fokker in the 
mid-1990’s, the Dutch government sought to soothe this blow to national pride by 
reinvestment in several key aerospace areas. The JSF was chosen as the aircraft to save 
the military aerospace sector (with the Airbus 380 winning the job for the civilian side) 
and Dutch entry into the SDD phase of the JSF program thus occurred chiefly for reasons 
of industrial necessity.238 In fact, the $800 million invested by the Dutch into the SDD 
phase came from industry as well as government sources, establishing a new form of 
cooperation between the two and demonstrating the industrial importance of the program, 
according to then-Minister of Defense Henk van Hoof.239 As of August 2006, over 70 
companies in the Netherlands had received contracts totaling over $700 million, with 
opportunities still present for more industrial share.240 The Dutch State Secretary for 
Defense Procurement Cees van der Knaap recently mentioned a possible $10.8 billion in 
JSF-related business for the Netherlands, though one of Parliament’s concerns over 
Dutch involvement in the program is whether this return on investment will be 
realized.241 A further concern is the geographic, export control, and technology sharing 
limitations which prevent a “level-playing field” for Dutch companies hoping to win 
contracts.242 Many smaller firms vying for subcontracts feel unable to compete with U.S. 
firms more familiar with litigation involving technology export, or larger firms able to 
hire the required lawyers to understand such a complicated process.243 The Netherlands 
certainly understands the importance of JSF industrial participation to their national 
industry and thus the weight it will carry when the decision is made whether to purchase 
the aircraft. While issues exist as to the construct of the program, they do not appear 
significant enough to cause the Netherlands to terminate its JSF venture. 
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b. Denmark 
The Danish approach to industrial participation is somewhat different, 
seeing it instead as an enabler to achieving the overarching goal of purchasing the Joint 
Strike Fighter for its defense forces. This does not diminish the importance of the Danish 
aerospace industry to the program, however, as it remains the chief selling point to 
Parliament and thus the focus of the Danish effort during the SDD phase of the program. 
It is telling that the Danish national deputy in the JSF program office has a strong 
background in defense acquisition and an excellent working relationship with industry, 
though he represents the Royal Danish Air Force.244 Denmark contributed $125 million 
to the SDD phase (partnering with Norway to meet the minimum requirement as a team), 
a substantial amount of its defense budget. Industry was persuaded to contribute $20 
million of this, with the positive experience of F-16 offsets and the anticipated benefits of 
JSF industrial participation playing a large role in the decision.245 The Danish JSF 
national deputy now plays an active role in ensuring industry is satisfied with the 
direction of their investments.246 Concerns over this aspect of the program are similar to 
those of the Netherlands, with issues arising as to the viability of small foreign firms 
winning contracts despite complicated U.S. export restrictions. Also, larger firms have 
the opportunity to absorb costs upfront that can later be recouped in the production phase, 
again presenting obstacles to smaller firms and thus smaller nations such as Denmark.247 
Like the Netherlands, Denmark places significant importance on industrial participation 
in convincing those who will decide to purchase the JSF and any grievances with the 
aspect of the JSF program are overshadowed by the positive experience thus far.248 
 
c. Norway 
Norway’s view of the JSF industrial participation program is somewhat 
different from Demark’s and the Netherlands and plays a large role in making this nation 
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the most likely to purchase other aircraft when the decision is made. The 2003 U.S. 
Department of Defense Report “JSF International Industrial Participation” identified 
several major obstacles in Norway’s approach to the program that hindered its ability to 
secure contract work. The Norwegian government, for example, has admitted that despite 
forming government/industry working groups, it did not set up a structure or offer the 
support necessary to industry to maximize its chances of success. Officials in the 
Norwegian Ministry of Defense have remarked that they admired the Netherlands and 
Canada for taking a more strategic approach to JSF industrial participation for their 
aerospace industries.249 The Norwegian Government, which contributed all of the $125 
million to the JSF SDD phase, considered this to be enough help to its aerospace 
industry, but this thinking was based more on an offset program, which in fact the JSF is 
not.250 
The JSF practice of awarding contracts on “best value” instead of offsets 
such as in the F-16 program was initially little understood in Norway and has led to 
several threats of pullout from the SDD phase.251 High ranking officials in influential 
positions have repeatedly demonstrated either a lack of willingness to compete for 
contracts, or a lack of understanding in this aspect of the program. In February 2006, the 
acting president of Norway’s 850,000 member confederation of trade unions remarked 
“No offsets, no plane…the offset success of the F-16 program must be repeated without 
question…Lockheed Martin should have known that this is how we do business here.”252 
While such motives for rejecting a program based on more efficient production from 
workers may be somewhat excusable considering the source, Norwegian industry at times 
has seemingly rejected “best value” out of sheer misunderstanding. For example, 
Norway’s largest defense firm, Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace (or KDA), was 
contacted by Lockheed Martin to bid on parts of the JSF Carrier Version’s arresting gear, 
but declined to bid for reasons that it considered itself more capable of contributing to the 
                                                 
249 JSF International Participation, 57. 
250 Col. Arnt Arnsten interview, 4 October 2006. 
251 For example, Norway nearly left the program in May of 2006 before Lockheed Martin found a 
substantial amount of ‘best value’ contracts that Norway would win if it desired. See Graham Warwick, 
“Norway to Stay in JSF for Now,” Flight International, 16 May 2006. 
252 Joris Janssen Lok, “Norwegian Unions Press for JSF Offsets,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 8 March 
2006. 
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higher technology aspects of the project such as software design and weapons interface. 
This prompted Norway’s Assistant Director General at the Ministry of Defense, Christian 
Tybring-Gjedde, to remark: 
‘Best value’ is not ‘best value’…it’s targeted…Lockheed Martin tells 
Kongsberg ‘you will compete for this and that’…We feel that Lockheed 
Martin predeciding who gets RFPs (requests for proposal) is not a ‘best 
value’ approach.253 
KDA’s relationship with Lockheed Martin has been strained due to such differing views 
of the JSF program approach, where ironically the American firm’s intentions have been 
to help KDA secure contracts.254  
Relations have warmed in the latter half of 2006, but a lack of familiarity 
in dealing with American companies and the resultant lack of communications between 
KDA and Lockheed renders Norway unsure if it already missed valuable opportunities 
and whether it can compete for remaining contracts. It has teamed with Canada and 
Denmark to bid for contracts together in order to take advantage of their experience with 
American business.255 However, it may be a question of too little too late for KDA and 
Lockheed. KDA has reportedly experienced quite positive results working with the 
Eurofighter program in terms of open communication in helping it win contracts.256 And 
with the Eurofighter and Gripen programs offering substantial offset packages in the 
event of sales, Norway’s previously negative experience with the JSF program may prove 
too much to overcome.257 
 
d. Belgium 
As the only non-participating member of EPAF in the Joint Strike Fighter 
program to this point, Belgium and the role of its industry in abstaining is significant. 
When Belgium considered joining the SDD phase in 1999, the government consulted 
                                                 
253 JSF International Industrial Participation, 58. 
254 Ibid., 57. 
255 Col Arnt Arnsten Interview, 4 October 2006, and JSF International Industrial Participation, 57. 
256 JSF International Industrial Participation, F-4. 
257 NOTE: A major interest of Norwegian industry involves the inclusion of the Naval Strike Missile, 
produced by KDA, in the airframe design. Lockheed Martin has been keen to include this in design 
proposals in order to keep Norway as a partner in the project. 
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industry officials in order to determine the potential impact. Interest in Belgium’s major 
aerospace firms was high in joining the venture, as previous experience with the F-16 
program had yielded positive results and good working relationships.258 Between May 
and December much lobbying took place on behalf of industry in the Belgian 
government. In October, three key firms (one from each of the country’s regions) 
collaborated to offer the government $6 million to aid in joining the SDD phase. At this 
point, the government apparently decided not to decide, as no official reason was granted 
to industry representatives for Belgium’s eventual abstention from the program. 
Coincidentally, André Flahaut became Minister of Defense in July of 1999 (see page 86). 
Key industry officials have indicated their continued desire for contracts, but have 
received vague responses from government officials regarding Belgium’s chances of 
involvement with the JSF.  
Thus, Belgian defense firms seem to have been usurped by politicians’ 
interests in this case, and remain discontented for having missed a large opportunity to 
advance their industry. In fact, in mid-2006 a Dutch firm sought bids for involvement in 
the privatized maintenance of their F-16’s. The Belgian firm Techspace-Aero was 
informed their business case was the best but would not be considered due to their lack of 
involvement in the Joint Strike Fighter program.259 The exclusion from the JSF program 
is felt by Belgian aerospace industry still in 2006, and indicates a shift toward a “JSF” 
and “non-JSF” separation in European defense industries. 
 
e. Other JSF International Program Concerns 
One issue certainly worrisome to the JSF team is the recent offset deals 
offered by both Gripen and Eurofighter to potential European JSF customers. The Danish 
firm Terma signed a Memorandum of Understanding recently with the Eurofighter 
consortium to pursue industrial work together in the event of a buy, though no figures 
were discussed. Saab has offered Denmark 48 Gripen fighters at a cost of $1.82 billion, 
including 100 percent offsets, which certainly will look tempting to the Danes from a 
                                                 
258 NOTE: The aforementioned matter with recoupments was viewed as a political issue and appears 
to have had no major effect on defense firms themselves. 
259 Jean-Paul Eggen, Techspace-Aero, Liège Belgium. Telephone interview by author, 30 October 
2006.  
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financial standpoint.260 Surely sensing the blood in the water over Norway’s lack of 
confidence in the JSF industrial participation program, Eurofighter recently offered 
Norway $6.3 billion of guaranteed offset work in the event of a purchase, and Saab 
proposed 48 Gripens at $3.1 billion with 100 percent offsets as well, a price lower than 
previous offers.261 The Joint Strike Fighter’s innovative industrial participation program 
could end up working to its disadvantage in the case of Norway by inciting competition 
that it is unable to match. 
An important matter relating to industrial participation is that of limited 
technology sharing between the U.S. and its allies. While this issue has been made most 
public by the UK (the only Tier 1 partner) and its demands for operational sovereignty 
(see page 83), the Tier 2 and Tier 3 partners also see it as an impediment to their 
industries securing contracts. Often, the problems lie not with U.S. industry or even the 
Department of Defense, but rather existing export control laws, making the State 
Department and massive U.S. bureaucracy appear as the villain. Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Norway have all expressed concern that such laws especially limit the 
ability of smaller firms to secure JSF contracts. Recently, steps have been taken to 
alleviate the problem, with Lockheed Martin and President Bush both assuring the UK 
this year that a technology transfer solution will be found to allow them to achieve their 
operational sovereignty goals.262 Also, the DOD continues to work to assuage concerns, 
as evidenced in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review:  
Whenever possible, the U.S. works with and through others, enabling 
allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing 
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challenges…winning the long war requires…overhauling traditional 
foreign assistance and export control laws…where necessary providing 
advanced military technology to foreign allies and partners.263  
However, much work is to be done in this realm to ensure smaller allies are not driven 
toward European programs due to easier access to technology. A 2003 GAO report found 
that Lockheed Martin and the JSF Program Office were aggressively working to find 
solutions to this problem so that smaller defense companies would not be forced out.264 
The process remains extremely cumbersome in the U.S. due to existing legislation,265 but 
work in the JSF program office continues daily on this issue. (See page 53 for an 
overview of recent legislation in this matter.) The allies seem to understand that work is 
being done to alleviate the problem, but the limitations of the system certainly poses the 
danger of smaller industries giving up their efforts to access U.S. technology and thus 
taking their governments with them to a competing program such as Eurofighter or 
Gripen. It is difficult to tell how this variable weighs on decisions to continue in the JSF 
program, but the solution ultimately lies in the satisfaction of the partners with their 
nations’ industrial participation. 
In sum, the industrial participation aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter 
program is perhaps the most important facet for convincing governments to 
enter/continue the venture and eventually purchase the aircraft. Experience in the F-16 
program for the EPAF seems to hold influence over their views toward JSF industrial 
participation. Belgian industry desired entry into the SDD phase to advance its interests, 
keen to repeat successes in the MNFP program, but political concerns prevented it. The 
Danish military sees industrial participation foremost as an avenue to convince decision-
makers to purchase the best aircraft, while at the same time profiting from a seemingly 
lucrative long-term venture, again building on positive experience with U.S. industry 
                                                 
263 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 
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through the F-16 program. The Netherlands military sees JSF as a means to save its 
military aviation industry and like Denmark places great importance on 
government/industry cooperation to maximize the benefits the program offers. Norway, 
on the other hand, had less experience (though not necessarily unfavorable) in the F-16 
venture, and misunderstandings and poor communications with Lockheed Martin in the 
JSF program have led to negative feelings so far as to the benefits it offers. Issues such as 
technology transfer limits with the U.S. and competing (and simpler) offers of industrial 
offsets from Eurofighter and Saab may in fact sway them to seek non-JSF options in the 
future. 
 
3. Military Concerns 
While the System Design and Development Phase offers nations the opportunity 
to bid for JSF contracts and secure future recoupments provided they continue in the 
program, it also allows access to the aircraft itself and some degree of influence in the 
design requirements. As a Tier 1 partner, the UK is essentially an equal at the negotiation 
table, with 10 staff positions including certain senior level ones on integrated product 
teams. Italy and the Netherlands are afforded a certain degree of design influence as the 
Tier 2 partners, while the Tier 3 benefits include one program office staff member and no 
official vote for requirements.266 These differences in prescribed degrees of influence and 
corresponding ambiguities have caused concern among certain partner countries as to 
how much say they have in the design of the aircraft and exactly what their investment in 
the SDD phase is buying them. Negotiations in this area also indicate nations’ 
perceptions of the aircraft’s capabilities and the importance they place on its ability to 
defeat anticipated threats. 
Denmark and Norway, as Tier 3 partners, realize their influence to be limited 
concerning aircraft design requirements. But as previously discussed, Norway is 
aggressively lobbying Lockheed Martin to include an option for its Naval Strike Missile 
in the design. This appears to be looked at more as an industrial issue for parties 
involved, as Norway normally should not dictate aircraft specifications; yet as a partner 
seriously considering other options it is afforded a certain margin of flexibility. The                                                  
266 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition GAO Report, 11. 
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Danish Air Force has indicated that it considers the JSF a superior aircraft to its 
competitors though it maintains no aspirations of influencing the capabilities of the final 
product as a Tier 3 partner. In fact, the Danish indications are that it trusted the aircraft to 
be a superior product but placed equal or more importance on the jet’s ability to make 
Denmark interoperable with the U.S. as a coalition partner.267 
With $800 million invested as a Tier 2 partner, the Netherlands commands a 
considerably more vocal role in the JSF program. Aircraft capability is of utmost 
importance to the Dutch, as they have invested a considerable amount in comparative 
aircraft and threat perception studies, concluding that the JSF with its stealth capability 
and highly advanced technology is the only solution for their future fighter needs.268 
Therefore, a say in aircraft capabilities is a must and is indicated not only by plans to 
purchase aircraft in the initial phases of production to perform test and evaluation with 
the U.S., but also by the engineering (as opposed to acquisition) background of the Dutch 
national deputy in the program office. For them, merely having a “foot in the door” to 
listen to U.S. and UK decisions is not enough, but ambiguities in the design of different 
tiers has caused some consternation on the Dutch side. Representatives have indicated 
there are too many “closed door meetings” and too much U.S. domination of the design 
specifications, in certain instances with little regard to their more sizable investment and 
Tier 2 status in the program. However, it was acknowledged that such issues were being 
addressed and did not threaten further Dutch participation in the program.269 
The Belgian Air Force, as one could guess, maintains differing views on the JSF 
from certain domestic political factions. Consensus holds that the aircraft will be far 
superior to its current competitors and necessary to eventually maintain the viability of 
Belgium’s combat air arm. Unlike its three EPAF partners, Belgium plans to fly its F-
16’s longer, at least until 2020 and perhaps 2025, which means a decision on the 
replacement may not happen until 2015. For this reason, the nation has signed on for 
more upgrades to its F-16’s than its partners and intends to keep its current fleet of 
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fighters as capable as possible as long as the existing industrial base continues to support 
the aircraft. As U.S. F-16’s are phased out in favor of the JSF and EPAF nations begin to 
transition to the JSF, the Belgian Air Force will likely push for an FMS buy of the JSF. 
The decision to forego the initial phases of the program does not reflect any military 
disregard for the aircraft or the program.270 
U.S. domination of the program is of course an issue felt by all the partner 
countries at differing levels. The most public incident causing enormous consternation to 
a partner country involved the U.S. Department of Defense’s proposal to cancel the F-
136 engine, a Rolls-Royce product intended to provide an alternate engine as well as 
huge manufacturing opportunities for the project’s most important partner. Following 
pleas directly from Prime Minister Tony Blair to U.S. President George W. Bush, the 
engine program was reinstated but not before trust between the two partners had suffered 
a serious blow. Logically, smaller nations viewed this as a lack of concern for the 
international aspect of the JSF program, and feared further loss of influence if such 
actions continued. In the end, a decision taken by the DOD solely for the purpose of 
making budget restrictions was reversed due to the influence of much more important 
political factors. Nevertheless, this incident contributed to other allies’ concerns about the 
true nature of such a “cooperative” program.271 
The importance of aircraft capabilities and allied influence over them, in 
sum, illustrates priorities of partner on both sides of the Atlantic. Issues such as 
involvement in design requirements have mixed with other concerns such as what exactly 
an investment in the program entails in regard to a say in the program, as well as who’s 
voice is truly heard at the negotiation table. The unprecedented design of the international 
participation aspect of the program thus has seen some growing pains over its initial  
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years, with lessons drawn on both sides, but evidence suggests that the U.S. side is 
willing to accommodate as required in order to keep partners satisfied, or at least enough 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis attempted to elucidate the current status of the so-called capabilities 
gap and the value Europe places on coalition warfare with the U.S. through a selective 
case study of nations expected to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. By examining 
the rationale involved in national decisions to enter the U.S.-led JSF program, it sought 
the degree of seriousness Europe places on increasing its military capabilities and the 
significance it places on defense cooperation with the U.S. in the future. In order to 
answer such broad questions, we must first analyze the conclusions derived from the 
examination of procurement decisions regarding the Joint Strike Fighter. 
 
A. RATIONALE FOR NATIONAL STANCES TOWARD JOINT STRIKE 
FIGHTER 
This study found that militaries in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway by and large favored the JSF as the replacement to their F-16 fighters for reasons 
of capability, interoperability, and continuing a strong military-to-military relationship 
with the United States. Military views generally held that technology and capabilities 
found in this aircraft would allow the air forces to meet current and anticipated threats in 
the air and on the ground for the foreseeable future, more so than its competitors. Great 
value was placed on experience in the F-16 cooperative program from the perspective of 
shared equipment, logistics, maintenance, tactics, and operational mindset. The increased 
weight and importance of these factors and general technological interdependence as will 
be found in the JSF is not lost on its potential operators, but most share the view that 
those making procurement decisions do not fully appreciate the importance of such 
factors in the 21st century. 
Industrial factions generally found the JSF and its corresponding opportunities for 
national defense firms to be advantageous over its competitors. Gaining access to U.S. 
technology was a factor in addition to the opportunity to have a foot in the door of the 
largest ever transatlantic defense project. At times the benefits of industrial participation 
were not fully understood by participating nations and their defense industries which may 
be partly blamed on poor communication from the U.S. side. A lack of experience in 
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dealing with American industry, an initial unwillingness to subscribe to the JSF 
program’s “best value” structure, and restrictive U.S. export control laws may lead to a 
country leaving the program. In general, broader industrial experience in the F-16 
program led to increased likelihood of active industry involvement in the JSF project. 
Industries in those nations with favorable F-16 experience were also able to better lobby 
politicians to enter the JSF program. And those nations more concerned with building up 
aerospace industries saw better cooperation between government and industry. Lastly, 
evidence indicates that the aerospace defense industry in Europe is already being divided 
into “JSF” and “non-JSF” poles, causing certain concern in defense firms. 
Politicians ultimately decide which weapons to procure, and this is no different 
with the JSF. This study found that Parliaments and Ministries of Defense and Finance 
played the most powerful roles in European decisions to enter the Joint Strike Fighter 
program, and these organizations took inputs from industry more than from militaries 
when making their choices. Generally, the nations with leftist governments solicited less 
input from military advisors while justifying the decisions to their publics. Those with 
members of leftist parties in key positions such as the Minister of Defense seemed less 
interested in joining the program. Also, politicians in the country with the most favorable 
attitude toward the European Union (Belgium) seem the least likely to purchase the JSF.  
Thus, when the military, economic, and political factors which affect decisions of 
these four “expected” JSF customers are merged, it is not surprising that political issues 
win out. Those most likely to purchase the aircraft (Denmark and the Netherlands) have 
strong connections between government, industry, military, and the United States. 
Denmark’s military realizes that industrial benefits will sell the jet to politicians, and 
Dutch military representatives sell it through their increased involvement in the design of 
the aircraft as a Tier 2 customer. But these relationships are ultimately enabled by the 
politicians themselves. Norway and Belgium, the least Atlanticist and more leftist of the 
four countries, are hindered by a lack of support between government and industry, or in 
Belgium’s case no support by government to military or industry. This thesis holds that 
this is by design, as politicians’ agendas in such countries do not seem to include interest 
in the JSF project. 
107 
This study reached several other key conclusions regarding Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway. First, the EU or the EDA as institutions will probably bear 
no influence on the decision of these nations to choose between the JSF and a European 
aircraft, though countries may purchase a European jet for differing reasons. Next, 
capabilities are important to these nations, and they will replace their fighters with an 
aircraft they consider capable of performing the anticipated mission; but capabilities may 
not be the first priority when choosing a replacement (e.g. when compared to budgetary 
constraints). Lastly, while the F-16 program offered great benefits to military and 
industry (greater in some countries than others) its influence likely will take a backseat to 
other issues when politicians decide whether to procure the JSF. Europeans still care 
about maintaining capabilities in the air and continuing positive defense cooperation with 
the United States. Thus, the reasons these nations may not choose the JSF should not 
alarm U.S. policymakers, however further review hints that the fact they may abstain 
from the program could threaten relations in the future. 
 
B. CLOSING THE GAP AND THE VALUE OF COALITION WARFARE 
WITH THE U.S. 
As it stands in 2006, the capabilities gap as concerns aerial warfare is not 
worsening. With the Eurofighter and Rafale now joining the Gripen in operational 
squadrons around NATO, European air forces are more capable than ever in regards to 
precision-guided strike, all-weather abilities, and air-to-air capabilities against enemies 
close-in and beyond visual range. The MIDS data-link system even allows them to pass 
information between themselves and other NATO assets, including American aircraft. 
For now, European aircraft have more or less caught up to American capabilities. 
However, when the JSF adds its abilities of stealth and electronic warfare (and likely 
other key areas which remain classified) to air forces beginning around 2013, the 
capabilities gap will once again widen, likely much further than before, and nations 
settling on their next fighter choice in 2006 must take this into account. A choice against 




strength lies in its ability to gather and disseminate virtually all information on the 
battlefield, making interoperability with this platform more important than simply 
matching capabilities. 
For now, Europe understands the importance of interoperability, and in 2006 it 
seems that communication and data-sharing is at an all-time high on the battlefield with 
improvements continuing. However, this thesis determined that even now, a gap is 
opening between those with full access to American intelligence and information, and 
those without. The rewards of “holistic interoperability” offered by the JSF are immense, 
not only in the full range of communications, but in infrastructure support such as 
mission planning materials, and not least in the operational culture fostered by training 
with and operating the same platform long before arriving at the modern battlefield. A 
choice against this platform is a choice against interoperability with the Alliance’s most 
influential military. The “interoperability gap” between non-JSF and JSF nations and the 
dangers of being on the wrong side in the future seem to be understood by European 
militaries but the implications are lost on some politicians making the procurement 
decisions. Thus, perhaps unknown to those who need it most, the choice to forego the JSF 
will diminish a nation’s value as a coalition warfare partner to the U.S. in the future. 
  
C. CONCLUSION 
The rationale of countries toward the JSF program who are expected to buy the 
aircraft does not necessarily indicate unwillingness to increase military capabilities or 
disdain toward the U.S. as a coalition partner. As always, the politicians who make 
procurement decisions may never reveal the true reasons for such decisions. This study 
determined that in the case of the JSF those politicians who decide to abstain will do so 
out of either misunderstanding the benefits the aircraft offers in capabilities and 
interoperability, or the relative weight they place on those benefits versus domestic 
political issues, especially those with a more European-centric attitude. This does not 
imply anti-Americanism per se, but making the JSF decision based on this factor will in 
all probability prove to be detrimental, as the long-term strategic implications of not 
choosing the latest American aircraft are likely understood by few.  
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The United States will continue its unwavering advances in high-technology 
military hardware, but at the same time does not desire to leave its potential coalition 
partners behind. The JSF program offers allies the opportunity to get on board the 
technology train, but unfortunately those who do not will most likely be left behind. U.S. 
grand strategy does not advocate driving others away through superior technology; rather 
it desires capable coalition partners. However, the high level of R and D spending in 
America and the resultant U.S.-owned technology leaves few choices to American allies 
except buying American equipment or being a second-tier participant in future coalition 
conflicts. In this sense, the JSF will serve to polarize Europe and the NATO allies, into 
the JSF camp and the others, perhaps furthering the divide between the Atlanticist nations 
and the Gaullists.  
What is perhaps more disappointing for the future of transatlantic defense 
relations is the fact that this study only examined those nations expected to purchase the 
Joint Strike Fighter. Even if those four nations in the end purchased the aircraft and 
operated it alongside the U.S. for 30-40 years, many nations in Europe simply will not do 
so. France and Sweden will continue to operate their indigenous aircraft for as long as 
their industries remain viable, Germany will likely use the Eurofighter for many years to 
come, and the JSF may never be affordable to many smaller nations. History and reality 
show that all NATO members most likely will never operate the same aircraft, thus 
leading to a permanent divide between those who opt for U.S. technology and its benefits 
and those who attempt to match it through European alternatives. At the time of writing, 
the JSF manager at Lockheed, Tom Burbage, has announced the possibility of six other 
European nations joining the JSF program, all either NATO members or “close allies” 
looking to replace American-made fighters.272 This combined with the possibility of 
newer NATO members to the East purchasing the aircraft after defense budgets will 
allow it is certainly good news for Lockheed Martin and the U.S. government. And 
perhaps good news for NATO as a whole and its ability to operate cohesively in future  
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theaters of war. But from a European perspective, the JSF may spell doom for indigenous 
defense industries and autonomy on the battlefield. It seems that no matter how idealistic 
this transatlantic program appears, not all parties can win. 
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